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 Latino immigration to the Midwest during the twentieth century has received 
significant attention from historians, but most have focused on the early and middle 
decades of the century. The later decades of the twentieth century, when a significant new 
wave of Latino immigration brought many new arrivals to small rural communities have 
received less attention. This study examines the intersection of the restructuring of the 
meatpacking industry and Latino immigration to rural Midwestern communities from 
1960 to 2000. Dakota County, Nebraska--home to the flagship operation of Iowa Beef 
Packers, Inc. (IBP) from 1964 until the company was sold to Tyson, Inc. in 2001--
provides a case study to explore how changes in technology and industry practices 
required a constant flow of low-wage laborers to produce cheap meat for American 
consumers and how communities changed as immigration and a settled Latino population 
increased.  
The late twentieth century connection between immigration and the meatpacking 
industry was just one in a string of waves of migration from Central America, Mexico, 
and other regions which brought laborers to the Midwest. Latino (and other) immigrants 
were drawn to the Midwest throughout the twentieth century by job opportunities in 
agriculture, railroads, and industries. Immigrant experiences in Dakota County after 1969 
shared some features with earlier waves of migration, including the importance of family, 
neighbors, and religious groups in easing newcomers‟ transition to a new home. This 
  
study draws on a variety of sources, including oral history interviews with community 
members, and details the connections between the industry that attracted many new 
immigrants and their experiences as they settled in small towns in overwhelmingly rural 
areas.
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Introduction 
A New Wave of Immigration to the Midwest 
  
Dakota County, in the northeastern corner of Nebraska, had little to distinguish it 
from other rural Midwestern counties in 1960. It was home to just over 12,000 people, 
very few of whom were racial or ethnic minorities. Farming and a few light industrial 
operations in its biggest town, South Sioux City, anchored the local economy. In 1964, 
when Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. (later Iowa Beef Processors and then simply IBP) optioned 
land along Highway 77 between Dakota City and South Sioux City to build a beef 
slaughter and processing plant, community leaders welcomed the promise of 500 new 
jobs. Indeed, the plant eventually employed over 2,000 people and associated enterprises 
(trucking, by-products, and suppliers) created even more jobs. 
It would have been difficult to foresee all of the consequences of the company‟s 
choice of location, however, because IBP‟s operations were unlike those of any previous 
meatpacker. In the course of the next few decades, these communities experienced 
significant changes as their populations grew and became more demographically diverse. 
By 2000 the county was home to just over 20,000 people, nearly a quarter of them 
Hispanic. At that time, bakeries, restaurants, and other businesses owned by recent 
immigrants lined Dakota Avenue, the main thoroughfare through South Sioux City. A 
locally-owned and operated Spanish-language newspaper, Mundo Latino, reported on 
local events alongside the South Sioux City Star. 
Two major and related historical trends converged to create the changes in Dakota 
County. First was a radical transformation of the meatpacking industry during the second 
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half of the twentieth century, as packing plants moved out of cities like Chicago, Omaha, 
and St. Louis and into rural areas throughout the Midwest and Great Plains. Second, the 
continuing migration of Latinos to places of economic opportunity in the Midwest and 
Great Plains brought substantial numbers of new workers for the meatpacking industry. 
Some immigrants found the opportunities they were looking for in this changed packing 
industry. Others struggled with the hardships presented by a dangerous and demanding 
workplace and the difficulties of adapting to a new home. 
Historians of the U.S. meatpacking industry have traced the structural changes of 
the industry, often in response to developments in technology and demand, from colonial 
times to the beginning of the twenty-first century. Jimmy M. Skaggs offers the most 
comprehensive look at the related endeavors of livestock raising and meatpacking in the 
United States up to the 1980s. Even though the changes that IBP had made were only 
about fifteen years old at the time, Skaggs notes a period of great prosperity for the new 
meatpackers that emerged after World War II and suggests the new companies utilized 
new technology to replace the old oligopoly of meatpacking firms that dominated the 
industry during the first half of the twentieth century.
1
 Wilson J. Warren offers a 
narrower focus, centered on the Midwest where, he argues, “the industry has been most 
significant.” He, like Skaggs, notes the decline of the old oligopoly and the rise of the 
new, led by IBP, but he also examines more carefully the connections between the 
meatpacking industry and the economic, cultural, and environmental changes that 
followed when such operations moved from city to countryside. Warren devotes only a 
few pages of his study to the changing demographics of the workforce in meatpacking 
                                                 
1
 Jimmy Skaggs, Prime Cut: Livestock Raising and Meatpacking in the United States, 1607-1983, (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1986). 
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communities, but he does suggest that the change is most directly a result of the packers‟ 
desire for low-cost labor.
2
  
Several labor historians have also written about the meatpacking industry during 
the twentieth century.
 3
 After World War II, meat production moved to less union-
friendly rural areas, production methods were modernized, and the labor force became 
more diverse and less stable. There followed a steep decline in both the size and strength 
of organized labor. The connections between the decline of organized labor in 
meatpacking and the simultaneous drop in wages, as well as high rates of injury and high 
turnover are clear. Business and labor historian Roger Horowitz, much like Warren, 
contends that “the decisive factor behind the revolution in the meat industry was the drive 
by management to decrease the share of the industry‟s wealth that went to production 
workers.”4 He is correct that the major meatpackers of the second half of the twentieth 
century, led by IBP, cut wages and benefits repeatedly, but it is difficult to see how this 
transformation would have happened without advances in technology and transportation. 
If management‟s drive was the decisive factor, the old Big Four meatpackers (Swift, 
Armour, Wilson, and Cudahy) would have done the same thing long before. Paying 
production workers less for their time would not have been possible without 
simultaneously deskilling their work by mechanizing many tasks and dividing up the rest. 
The high rate of turnover in meatpacking would likewise have been impossible if 
the employees had remained highly-skilled butchers who required months of training to 
                                                 
2
 Wilson J. Warren, Tied to the Great Packing Machine: The Midwest and Meatpacking, (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 2007), 67. 
3
 Shelton Stromquist and Marvin Bergman, Unionizing the Jungles: Labor and Community in the Twentieth 
Century Meatpacking Industry, (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1997); Roger Horowitz, “Negro and 
White, Unite and Fight!”: A Social History of Industrial Unionism in Meatpacking, 1930-1990, (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1997). 
4
 Horowitz, 248. 
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become proficient. Training workers to repeat one or two tasks thousands of times a day 
required significantly less investment from the company and allowed management to 
disregard employee complaints or concerns as long as they could keep a steady flow of 
new workers coming in. This is the point where the reshaping of the meatpacking 
industry and immigration intersect. IBP‟s production methods and overall business 
strategy would have failed in rural communities were it not for the availability of 
immigrant (and refugee) laborers. Likewise, immigrant laborers would not have been in 
those communities if not for the meatpacking plants.   
These changes in industrial practice and migration are part of a broader historical 
literature on the wave of late-twentieth-century Latino immigration which is just 
beginning to develop. Two historians have identified the newest round of migration to the 
Midwest in the late twentieth century as part of a much longer historical trend, stretching 
back to railroad and agricultural laborers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, though neither has written at great length about the recent arrivals. Oscar J. 
Martínez, in addition to framing Mexican and Mexican-American migration to the 
Midwest in such a broad scope, suggests that it was the same economic activities 
(agriculture and railroads, especially) that had previously allowed for the growth of the 
Mexican-origin population in the Southwest that were once again responsible for drawing 
migrants to the Great Plains and the Midwest. James A. Garza, taking a similar long-view 
approach, argues that patterns and practices established by Mexican and Mexican-
American migrants during the earlier migrations profoundly shaped the experiences of 
those who followed later in the twentieth century and that these connections continue to 
shape the experiences of new immigrants. Both authors stress the importance of the long 
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history of migration to the formation of a regional Mexican-American identity unique to 
the Great Plains and Midwest.
5
   
Historian Anthony Quiroz‟s suggestion that a bicultural identity was an essential 
part of Mexican Americans‟ “quest for public legitimacy” in Victoria, Texas, suggests 
one way that tightly-knit ethnic communities, whether recent immigrants or long-
standing residents, can adapt to the dominant culture without giving up their own culture.  
This identity allowed Mexican Americans to succeed within the larger society of work, 
school, and politics without giving up their cultural world of family, home, 
neighborhood, and church.
6
  Immigrants and migrants to Dakota County acted in a 
similar way, adjusting to many of the expectations and challenges of their new home 
while relying on cultural connections within their ethnic community as resources. 
Several studies by historians of earlier Mexican migration to the Midwest, 
especially Dennis Nodín Valdés, Zaragosa Vargas, and Jim Norris, provide some 
foundations upon which the study of more recent migrations can be built.
7
  Nodín Valdés 
and Vargas have written about the ethnic enclaves that developed in major urban areas of 
the Midwest, such as St. Paul and Detroit, in the early twentieth century. Norris covers 
the small settlements and migrant communities of agricultural laborers in rural areas 
                                                 
5
 Oscar J. Martínez, Mexican-Origin People in the United States: A Topical History, (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 2001). James A. Garza, "The Long History of Mexican Immigration to the Rural Midwest," 
Journal of the West 45 (Fall 2006): 57-64. 
6
 Anthony Quiroz, Claiming Citizenship: Mexican Americans in Victoria, Texas, (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2005). 
7
 Dennis Nodín Valdés, "Settlers, Sojourners, and Proletarians: Social Formation in the Great Plains Sugar 
Beet Industry, 1890-1940," Great Plains Quarterly, (1990): 110-123; Dennis Nodín Valdés, Al Norte: 
Agricultural Workers in the Great Lakes Region, 1917-1970, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991); 
Dennis Nodín Valdés, Barrios Norteños : St. Paul and Midwestern Mexican Communities in the Twentieth 
Century, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000);  Zaragosa Vargas, "Armies in the Fields and Factories: 
The Mexican Working Classes in the Midwest in the 1920s," Mexican Studies / Estudios Mexicanos 
(1991): 47-71; Zaragosa Vargas, Proletarians of the North: A History of Mexican Industrial Workers in 
Detroit and the Midwest, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993); Jim Norris, 
North for the Harvest: Mexican Workers, Growers, and the Sugar Beet Industry, (St. Paul: Minnesota 
Historical Society Press, 2009). 
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during the same time period. All of these settled immigrant communities established 
churches, opened businesses, and formed mutual assistance associations. They relied on 
their connections to family, neighborhood, and religious community to get by in hard 
times and to celebrate in good times. 
Anthropologists, sociologists, geographers, and political scientists have 
undertaken much more extensive examination of Latino (and other) migration to places in 
the rural Midwest in the late twentieth century than have historians.
8
 Taken together, their 
work provides some insight into the experiences of recent immigrants and the 
communities they joined, such as the challenges for both new arrivals and the existing 
members of communities in adapting to language and cultural differences while meeting 
community needs for work, education, and health care. Many of these works portray the 
arrival and settlement of these immigrants as a new trend, however, and largely ignore 
the longer historical context.  The demographic data bear out that there had not been 
settled populations of Latinos prior to the most recent influx in the specific communities 
that they examine, so these scholars are not wrong to suggest that there is something new 
about their subjects. The origins of immigrants to the United States shifted dramatically 
after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (the Hart-Cellers Act), away from 
Europe and toward Asia and Latin America. Considering past events and trends around 
the region--including settlements, seasonal or temporary residents, and the Bracero 
program, which brought many Mexican workers to the United States between 1942 and 
                                                 
8
 A few edited volumes that exemplify this approach are: Douglas S. Massey, ed., New Faces in New 
Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigration, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008); 
Victor Zúñiga and Rubén Hernández León, eds., New Destinations: Mexican Immigration to the United 
States, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005); and Donald D. Stull, Michael J. Broadway and David 
Griffith, eds., Any Way You Cut It: Meat Processing and Small-Town America, (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1995). Also see Deborah Fink, Cutting into the Meatpacking Line: Workers and Change 
in the Rural Midwest, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998) which presents findings from 
the author‟s participant observation at an IBP pork packing plant in Perry, Iowa. 
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1964--can provide some of that missing context, however, and contribute to a more 
historical understanding of the most recent wave of immigration. There is a lengthy 
record of immigrant labor in the Midwest that shaped the experiences of recent 
immigrants as well as the interpretations and reactions of existing residents in these 
communities. 
While some scholars consider the new wave migrations a significant shift away 
from older migration patterns--and they are correct to point out the shift in origins and 
destinations--there are also a number of continuities. Not only do the new migrations 
follow patterns similar to Mexican immigrants of the early twentieth century, they also 
follow broad patterns similar to those of European immigrants during that same time. For 
instance, new wave migrants have often settled in rural areas because of the availability 
of work in industrial agriculture or industries that process agricultural products because 
these are often low-skill jobs with few barriers to new entrants. European and Mexican 
immigrants alike often settled in urban areas in the early twentieth century. The 
availability of industrial jobs (including meatpacking) attracted immigrants to the cities. 
In industrial centers like Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and many others, immigrants could 
find employment even with limited knowledge of English and virtually no special skills. 
So long as they were willing to put in long, hard hours in poor conditions, work was 
available. And they were willing, for many of the same reasons that drove Mexicans, 
Mexican Americans, other Latinos, Southeast Asians, and Africans to the rural Midwest 
and South in the late twentieth century: namely the prospect of earning a better living for 
the support of their families either in the United States or back in their home countries. 
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The fact that many recent immigrants ended up in rural America requires some 
explanation. Journalist and historian Richard E. Wood‟s recent assessment suggests that 
rural America has not fared well during the last half-century. Most rural small towns saw 
dramatic population declines (often greater than 10 percent), family farms were replaced 
by much larger corporate farms which required fewer workers per acre, and many 
industries moved manufacturing jobs overseas.
9
 The distribution of jobs was frequently in 
flux. While one community lost a factory to cheaper labor and operating costs outside the 
United States, others were attracting the industries that did remain in operation in the 
U.S. as companies fled from the higher operating costs of urban centers. Some 
communities gained hundreds or even thousands of new jobs, but others lost out entirely. 
While the pattern of industrial relocation was not uniform, it involved a shift from 
traditional manufacturing centers in the upper Midwest and Northeast to the south and 
west.  
One factor that mitigated rural decline was the influx of Latinos to rural America, 
especially from 1980 to 2000. The Latino population of rural America climbed from 1.5 
million to 3.2 million during this time period as new immigrants from Mexico and 
Central America (as well as internal migrants from California and Texas) moved in. Most 
of these newcomers settled in the same rural places that were attracting new or expanding 
industries--economic growth was accompanied by population growth. As was the case 
when Latino immigrants moved to the Midwest in the early twentieth century for work in 
                                                 
9
 Richard E. Wood, Survival of Rural America: Small Victories and Bitter Harvests (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2008), xiii. The phenomenon of rural to urban migration was not unique to the United 
States. China and India, in particular, as well as many other countries saw the migration of millions of 
people from rural areas to urban centers during the late twentieth century. 
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agriculture, on the railroads, or in urban industries, immigrants of the late twentieth 
century followed job opportunities to new locales. 
The experiences of Latino immigrants in rural areas of the U.S. during the most 
recent wave of immigration differed widely depending on their destination region. 
Persistent poverty in the rural South, for instance, presented significant challenges for 
newcomers due to a general lack of resources within the community. In contrast, Wood 
argues, “most plains states have continued to provide a relatively high level of education, 
healthcare, and social services.”10 This investment in people helped make it possible for 
newcomers to succeed, although such efforts were considerably less beneficial for 
individuals or families lacking legal documentation and therefore access to government 
services.  
Undocumented workers were unable to utilize social welfare services and often 
avoided health care agencies and the like for fear of being deported even where those 
services were available. Their children, however, did attend school and benefit from 
educational and nutritional programs there. Although much of the political and social 
discussion of immigration in recent years has focused on the issue of undocumented or 
illegal immigrants, this focus obscures the roots of the phenomenon. Changes in business 
and industry which increased demand for low-wage laborers in the second half of the 
twentieth century were crucial in drawing immigrants--both documented and 
undocumented--to the United States. Recalling this portion of the story of immigration 
helps put the causes of immigration as well as immigrant experiences in proper context. 
Despite significant changes in national and international politics and economics, 
Latino immigrants and migrants who in the late twentieth century moved to small towns 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., 17. 
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like Dakota City and South Sioux City--where ethnicity set the new arrivals apart from 
the majority of the population--shared many challenges and potential solutions with both 
the agricultural and urban industrial laborers that came to the region before them. Their 
strategies for surviving and thriving in these destinations were similar to those employed 
by earlier migrants from Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In all of these cases, ethnic 
enclaves formed around neighborhoods, churches, businesses, and other community 
groups that helped new arrivals deal with the challenges associated with making a new 
life in an unfamiliar place.
11
 The experiences of immigrants in Dakota County, Nebraska 
provide an excellent case study for explaining the many ways that late-twentieth-century 
immigrants can be seen as continuing the long historical trend identified by historians 
Oscar Martínez and James Garza with regard to Hispanic immigrants to the Midwest in 
particular, but also the patterns of immigration from Europe, Asia, and other places to the 
United States throughout the twentieth century. 
Garden City, Kansas, and Lexington, Nebraska, are the most well-documented 
instances of this “new migration.” The case of the Dakota City plant differs from these in 
important ways and it is thus crucial to understanding the overall trends. Garden City and 
Lexington experienced very rapid influxes of immigrants and refugees in the 1980s and 
1990s; the process of change in each community was condensed into a few years rather 
than several decades. Lexington, where IBP opened a plant in 1990, established a 
Community Impact Study Team which worked with researchers, policy experts, and 
company representatives in advance of the plant‟s opening to prepare for the expected 
                                                 
11
 Frederick C. Luebke, "Ethnic Group Settlement on the Great Plains," The Western Historical Quarterly 
(1977): 405-430; Frederick C. Luebke, ed., Ethnicity on the Great Plains, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1980); Frederick C. Luebke, ed., European Immigrants in the American West, (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1998). 
11 
 
influx of immigrants.
12
 In effect, they were able to predict and prepare for challenges 
such as the shortage of housing, the strain on social service agencies, and rising school 
enrollment. 
Because IBP‟s Dakota City plant was one of the first to employ the company‟s 
innovative slaughter methods and the very first to produce boxed beef, it was also where 
the company established the pattern of operation and labor recruiting that other plants 
would later follow. These innovative meatpacking procedures changed the nature of the 
work to such an extent that a new pattern of employment based on recruiting from pools 
of low-wage laborers, including immigrants and refugees as well as internal migrants, 
developed to meet the increased demand for workers. These changes in industrial and 
labor practices spurred the transformation of Dakota City and South Sioux City from 
struggling farming communities with homogeneous populations in 1960, to growing, 
economically prosperous towns by the end of the twentieth century. Along with this 
economic change, ethnic and cultural diversity increased, which presented both 
challenges and opportunities for the communities.   
 As meatpacking operations shifted to small towns around the Midwest and Great 
Plains in the second half of the twentieth century, these communities were among the few 
able to grow during a period of sustained rural decline. This growth came with costs, 
however, as IBP and its imitators undercut their competitors by simultaneously speeding 
up production while reducing labor costs (i.e. training, safety measures, wages, and 
benefits). The companies‟ method of doing business required a constant flow of new 
                                                 
12
 Lourdes Gouveia and Donald D. Stull, “Dances with Cows: Beefpacking‟s Impact on Garden City, 
Kansas, and Lexington, Nebraska,” in Any Way You Cut It: Meat Processing and Small-Town America, ed. 
by Donald D. Stull, Michael J. Broadway and David Griffith, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1995): 85-107. See also Eric Schlosser, Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal, 
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2001). 
12 
 
workers willing to labor in poor conditions for what was, by U.S. standards, low pay. For 
immigrants who came to work at the Dakota City plant as well as their families, 
economic and social hardships--both at work and in the larger community--were 
common. Some of these immigrants quickly found the challenges too difficult to bear and 
moved on to find other work. Those who put down roots despite the challenges relied on 
family, neighbors, and religious communities to help them adapt and succeed in their new 
homes.
13 
 
A Brief Note on Sources 
 Names of a number of sources interviewed for this project have been changed to 
protect their anonymity. The following are pseudonyms: 
 -Emilio Diaz 
 -Maria Diaz 
 -Marco Diaz 
 -Angel Fernandez 
 -Marina Galvan 
 -Juan Gutierrez 
 -Francine Jacobs 
 -Duc Tran 
 -Paola Velasco 
 -José Velasco 
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Map 1: IBP Beef Slaughter and Processing Plants  
Base map © OpenStreetMap contributors, CC-BY-SA 
http://www.openstreetmap.org 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/ 
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Map 2: South Sioux City and Dakota City 
Base map © OpenStreetMap contributors, CC-BY-SA 
http://www.openstreetmap.org 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/
16 
 
Chapter 1 
“An entire industry revolutionized” 
 
The meatpacking industry, dominated throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century by a small number of large firms (frequently referred to as the Big Four--Swift, 
Armour, Wilson, and Cudahy)
1
, changed quickly and dramatically after Currier Holman 
and Andrew D. Anderson teamed up to form Iowa Beef Packers in 1960. The two men 
were long involved with various aspects of meatpacking, from the stockyards to the 
boardroom, and saw opportunities to reduce inefficiencies in the packing industry and 
thereby out-compete their much larger and more well-established rivals. Anderson 
brought a keen interest in engineering and revolutionary ideas about the design and 
operation of meatpacking facilities, while Holman offered experience and drive in 
finance and administration. With investment from associates in Holman‟s earlier efforts 
at starting his own packing operation and a $300,000 loan from the Small Business 
Administration, they built and opened their first beef packing plant at Denison, Iowa in 
1961. They broke into the Fortune 500 just eight years later, with annual sales of $534 
million in 1969. IBP and a few imitators that followed their lead replaced the old 
oligopoly with an entirely new one.
2
 
The entire process of turning live cattle into beef at the market had already 
undergone important changes by 1960. In the early days of the packing industry in the 
United States, farmers and ranchers fattened cattle on grass and then drove the animals to 
central markets. In the late nineteenth century, railroads replaced the cattle drive, though 
                                                 
1
 Known first as the “Big Five” packinghouses (Swift, Armour, Wilson, Morris, and Cudahy), later the 
“Big Four” after Morris was purchased by Armour in 1923. 
2
 “The Youngest Giant,” Fortune, 15 May 1969: 293. 
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the animals‟ destinations remained largely the same. Enormous multi-story plants used 
gravity to move the carcass through the facility. Workers slaughtered the cattle and 
performed minimal processing before the carcasses (sides of beef) were shipped to 
destinations in all directions, again by rail.
3
 Shipping live animals and sides of beef was 
expensive and inefficient, however. Only a little more than half of a live animal consists 
of beef; even after removing the hide, hoofs, and entrails, sides of beef still contain a lot 
of bone and fat. In addition to the excess weight, shipping was detrimental to the live 
animals because it caused bruising and weight loss before the animals reached the plant. 
The sides of beef shipped out of the packing plant likewise lost weight (due to 
dehydration) during transportation. These were two of the areas where Currier and 
Holman saw possibilities for greater efficiency as they planned their new operation. 
Denison, a town of about 5,000 people situated in Crawford County in western 
Iowa, would never have been considered a prime location for a packing plant by the 
traditional leaders of the industry in 1960. The choice of location of Iowa Beef Packers‟ 
first plant was one of Currier and Holman‟s key innovations, however. Cincinnati, 
Chicago, Omaha, Kansas City, and Sioux City were the centers of the meat packing 
industry throughout the early twentieth century. There were many smaller packing 
operations in small towns throughout the Midwest and Great Plains, but these did not 
compete with the top companies; they simply filled local or regional niches. IBP set out 
to take over the industry by getting out of the cities and away from the strong union 
presence there. Their plan revised longstanding patterns in the industry. 
                                                 
3
 On the history of the meatpacking industry, see Jimmy Skaggs, Prime Cut: Livestock Raising and 
Meatpacking in the United States, 1607-1983, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1986) and 
Wilson J. Warren, Tied to the Great Packing Machine: The Midwest and Meatpacking, (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 2007). 
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The Denison plant employed an innovative single-story design intended just for 
cattle slaughter rather than the multi-storied, multi-species design common among all of 
the leading packing companies. In the early twentieth century, the old-line packers had 
mechanized some steps in the slaughter process to improve efficiency and used overhead 
rails to carry the suspended weight of carcasses. Anderson, the architect of IBP‟s 
slaughter and processing facilities, intended for his design to improve on this standard 
approach and to function much like assembly lines of the auto industry, except they 
would disassemble their product instead. Cattle would enter one end of the building and 
travel along adjustable-speed conveyors as they were processed and--crucially--cooled 
rapidly to prevent any shrinkage due to dehydration. Carcasses would undergo basic 
processing immediately after slaughter: hide, head, legs and bowels would be removed; 
the carcass split and then washed, weighed, and wrapped in cloth shrouds for cooling. 
This process took only minutes. Carcass beef would be shipped out by truck or rail after 
two days of cooling. Also like the auto industry, IBP‟s plan relied heavily on automation 
and fractionalizing tasks so that each worker had only one job.
4
 
IBP‟s Denison plant was a quick success. Less than a year after production began, 
the company expanded with the purchase of a second beef packing plant in Fort Dodge, 
Iowa, in November 1961. Another purchase, this time a pork operation in Perry, Iowa, in 
1963, turned out to be a brief detour from the company‟s focus on cattle rather than a new 
direction. IBP resold the Perry plant to Oscar Mayer & Company in 1965 for $4.3 
million, more than tripling its investment in two years.
5
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The company‟s early success was surprising to many industry observers, but not 
to Holman and Anderson. They had implemented innovations in the design of the 
physical plant, but also in the way they conducted the business of buying cattle. IBP 
deployed cattle buyers directly to farms throughout the surrounding countryside. Each 
buyer kept in contact with the Denison office through mobile radios, allowing them to 
follow buying instructions based on the latest market information. IBP‟s direct buying 
operations (rather than sales at terminal markets, which had been standard in the industry) 
were another feature that set the company apart: IBP bought about 85 percent of its cattle 
directly from farmers while the industry average was only 15 percent.
6
 The founders of 
the company were primed for expansion and their plan called for opening new locations 
to tap into other existing concentrations of cattle supply. Even in 1962 this strategy was 
clear; as Anderson told a trade journal, “The plant we have in Denison is as large as any 
packing house should be. Instead of increasing the size of this facility, we will build 
another plant in a new territory anytime we need to expand.”7 The combination of an 
abundant supply of cattle and cheap, non-union labor as well as access to both road and 
rail transport made IBP‟s plant in Denison successful; these factors also provided a 
pattern for the company‟s future growth. 
 IBP‟s choice of Dakota City, Nebraska as a site for a new plant in 1965 was well-
conceived. As early as 1959, 70% of Nebraska cattle were fed in the eastern third of the 
state, especially concentrated along the Elkhorn, Platte, and Missouri Rivers. This 
reflected not only the suitability of this part of the state for growing the grain used in 
fattening cattle, but also the proximity to important terminal markets and meatpacking 
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centers in Omaha, Nebraska, and Sioux City, Iowa.
8
 Dakota City, just south of Sioux City 
on the Nebraska side of the Missouri River, was a prime location to take advantage of 
existing cattle production as well as existing highway and railroad transportation systems 
to minimize costs and maximize efficiency. In addition to the existing supplies of cattle 
and abundant feed grain at relatively cheap prices, the Ogallala aquifer and the Missouri 
River provided much-needed water, which helped not only to keep grain prices low, but 
were also necessary to the slaughter and processing operations: modern packing plants 
can use upwards of 2 million gallons a day.
9
 
While IBP chose to locate its meatpacking plants near existing centers of cattle 
production in order to be close to the supply, the company‟s efforts also helped the cattle 
industry in those areas to grow. The new, highly efficient processing operations that IBP 
and others set up beginning in the early 1960s had a quick and noticeable impact on cattle 
production. Ralph D. Johnson, an agricultural economist with the United States 
Department of Agriculture at the University of Nebraska - Lincoln, cited efficient 
meatpacking operations as one of the top reasons that Nebraska and Iowa led growth in 
cattle production from 1962-1967 (sixty eight percent growth for Nebraska, fifty one 
percent for Iowa). As many as ninety percent of the animals slaughtered in these states in 
1967 were processed in plants that were less than ten years old. These plants utilized 
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innovations in technology and plant design to process cattle more quickly and more 
efficiently than their predecessors.
10
 
The proximity of the packing plants to supplies of cattle allowed for a more 
efficient process of getting live cattle to the slaughterhouse. Farmers and ranchers in the 
vicinity of these rural plants could market their livestock directly to packers rather than 
losing time and money sending them through buying terminals and stockyards. 
Previously, cattle from many producers would have been gathered at a buying terminal, 
loaded on railcars, and shipped to a stockyard in Chicago, Omaha, or Sioux City. Plants 
located closer to cattle producers, in conjunction with improved highways and increased 
trucking, allowed for the elimination of buying terminals and stockyards. Instead, trucks 
would haul live cattle from the farm, ranch, or feedlot directly to the slaughterhouse, 
where they would be killed and processed the same day. Cutting out the costs of 
terminals and stockyards allowed the producer to keep more of the price paid for their 
livestock while also allowing packers to pay less.
11
 
The development of the mechanically refrigerated trailer (the “reefer” in trucker 
parlance), along with improvements in diesel engine technology and the ever-expanding 
highway system broke the Big Four packers‟ domination of the rail-based distribution 
network. Historian Shane Hamilton credits this shift in transportation technology for 
setting in motion the restructuring of the entire industry. “The lowly reefer truck allowed 
between two and three thousand small, rural meatpackers to undermine the Big Four‟s 
monopoly power more effectively than any antitrust legislation had ever done.” 
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Beginning in the 1950s, trucks gave rural packers a way to bypass the old distribution 
network and compete with much larger companies centered in the cities. As early as 
1963, 60 percent of refrigerated meat was transported by truck.
12
 But without other 
significant changes in the way meat was processed and sold, companies like IBP would 
have never grown as quickly or as large as they did. 
Ironically, trucking played an important role in the development of a new 
monopoly just as it had destroyed the old one. Long-haul trucking was central to the 
creation of the modern feedlot system that grew in conjunction with the new-breed 
packers in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, IBP and a few other leaders in the industry 
dominated the distribution of beef by refrigerated truck and thereby drove competitors 
(both large, old firms and small upstarts) out of business.
13
 The flexibility of trucks (as 
compared to rail) was one of its greatest benefits: it allowed the development of direct 
marketing from cattle producers to packers and, with the advent of boxed beef in 1969, it 
allowed the product to be shipped directly to loading docks at supermarkets around the 
country without the need for branch houses and delivery trucks associated with the rail-
dominated system.
14
 
The possibility of slaughtering cattle as close as possible to the source, therefore, 
could drastically improve the efficiency of the packing operation. Cattle brought from 
farm or ranch--or, increasingly, commercial feedlot--directly to the packing plant by 
truck, slaughtered the same day, and then shipped meant the live animals (the least 
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efficient way to transport them) were shipped the shortest possible distance. Initially, IBP 
continued to ship their output as sides of beef just like their competitors, but they saw 
possibilities for greater efficiency in further processing of the meat as well as slaughter. 
In 1969, IBP remedied the inefficiency of shipping sides of beef by the 
introduction of an entirely new--but as far as Anderson and Holman were concerned, 
completely logical--product: boxed beef. Holman described the problem, and the 
solution, in 1968: “The route meat has taken from producer to table in the past has been 
incredibly inefficient. For no good reason, either. At times there have been 15 to 19 
middlemen all doing something to the meat and taking their cut. No wonder no one 
makes any money. We feel it can all be done, and will be done eventually, in a single 
plant.”15 Rather than shipping sides of beef to be cut up by a butcher in a grocery store or 
meat market, IBP further processed the beef at its Dakota City plant.  
The company hired hundreds of new workers to staff the production line (often 
considered separately from the slaughter process by both management and workers) 
where chilled carcasses were turned into marketable meat. Workers stood next to work 
tables along conveyor belts that transported the product, armed with meat hooks, knives, 
and sharpening steels. Each employee was assigned a specific cut or series of cuts which 
he or she repeated thousands of times each day. They produced vacuum-packed cuts of 
meat, trimmed of fat and bone, that could be shipped more efficiently (not only was 
excess weight eliminated, but boxes stack much more neatly in a refrigerated truck or 
railcar than sides of beef) and sold from grocery stores with only minimal further 
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processing required. As Dale C. Tinstman, vice chairman of IBP‟s board of directors, put 
it in an address he delivered in 1980, “An entire industry had been revolutionized.”16  
New Work and New Workers 
Turning carcass beef into marketable products--cuts that might appear in shops or 
on the dinner table--had long been the task of skilled butchers in meat markets or grocery 
stores. IBP eliminated the need for these skilled workers by separating the numerous 
steps of the process into discrete tasks. This allowed the company to essentially replace 
well-paid butchers with low-paid, unskilled laborers on their disassembly line in the 
Dakota City processing plant. In doing so, IBP reshaped a well-established system of 
distributing meat to customers and gained for the company a greater share of the process. 
It made the whole system of transforming cattle into beef more efficient, but this shift 
required a significant amount of unskilled labor in the rural locations in which IBP was 
developing its business.
17
 
The opening of the massive new IBP plant at Dakota City in 1966 was hailed by 
local boosters as a boon for the economic development of the area. Prior to this new 
enterprise, Dakota City and South Sioux City had been farming communities with little 
industrial development. Some manufacturing and meat processing were concentrated 
across the Missouri River in the larger and more developed regional hub, Sioux City, 
Iowa. Initial estimates suggested the Dakota City plant would employ 500 people, a 
substantial gain for two communities whose combined population was just over 8,000. In 
addition to the jobs created by the processing operations at IBP, opportunities for 
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investment and expansion in raising cattle, trucking, and in the processing of cattle 
byproducts (such as hide, hoof, hair, horn, blood, bone, and gland) also appeared 
promising to the surrounding communities.
18
 
Applicants for the new jobs in the packinghouse were plentiful as meatpacking 
was a well-paid and respectable occupation. Although it was wage work and therefore not 
considered a middle class occupation, meatpacking paid enough to support a family. 
Some people in South Sioux City and Dakota City had previous experience in the 
industry, having worked in the Swift, Armour, or Cudahy packinghouses in Sioux City, 
Iowa, or knowing others who had.
19
 Other applicants were simply family farmers or the 
children of farmers who moved out of agriculture as that sector of the economy became 
increasingly mechanized and concentrated in the hands of corporate farms during the 
second half of the twentieth century. IBP had little trouble finding workers for the Dakota 
City plant, just as they had experienced little trouble in their first plant in the small town 
of Denison, Iowa. Their model of moving to small towns close to the supply of livestock, 
hiring locals, and escaping the restrictive contracts of the unions in the big cities became 
famous and much emulated by other meatpacking companies.
20
 
But IBP‟s great success in modernizing the meatpacking industry did not come 
without difficulties. These challenges existed in the industry prior to IBP‟s emergence, 
but were exacerbated by the company‟s new business model. Labor relations was the 
biggest issue. The high cost of labor, due in part to powerful unions, was one factor that 
had made the old-line packers in the big cities of the Midwest less flexible in their 
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operations and thus limited possibilities for them to adapt to changing technologies and 
market conditions. Building or expanding plants in small towns allowed IBP to avoid or 
at least minimize the influence of unions on wages and benefits. Small towns in rural 
areas lacked the union organization and traditions which had been built up primarily in 
urban areas. A 1964 editorial in the Dakota County Star when IBP decided to build at 
Dakota City cited “a healthy labor situation void of a past history of disturbance” as one 
of the key attractions for the growing company. Despite a lack of strong union presence 
at the outset, some of their plants did organize eventually. But IBP refused to accept the 
master contracts that had prevailed with the Big Four in Chicago, Omaha, and other 
cities. The company insisted that their single-species slaughter operations, which required 
a less-skilled workforce, was fundamentally different from the operations of the old-line 
packers and therefore its workers should not be treated as if they were the same as those; 
skilled butchers who did work under the master contract.  
When faced with a strike at their Fort Dodge, Iowa, plant in 1965, IBP negotiated 
with United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) officials from Chicago to 
maintain the company‟s independence from the industry-wide wage scales and rules. 
With the help of Iowa Governor Harold Hughes, IBP succeeded. “We obtained language 
to operate our plant without the normal restrictions other packers had surrendered. We 
secured that right in that strike and have held it ever since,” reported Arden Walker, 
IBP‟s vice president of industrial relations, in 1979.21 Instead of making a master 
agreement which would cover all of the company‟s employees regardless of the plant in 
which they worked, management negotiated with union representatives at each plant 
separately. Using this approach, IBP isolated labor disputes in each location and 
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prevented all of their workers from taking collective action together--a move which 
would have strengthened the workers‟ negotiating position. The company kept their labor 
costs among the lowest in the industry throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century. As IBP expanded in the 1960s, it replaced the master-contract wage scales of the 
city with rural non-union pay rates.
22
 
By contrast, at the Dakota City plant in 1969, IBP‟s refusal to work with 
organized labor ran up against a strong union tradition that had spread to the plant from 
across the river in Sioux City, where meatpacking had long been an important industry. 
IBP had encouraged the formation of a small, independent union in the plant when it 
opened in order to prevent the UPWA--the union that had organized and won master 
contracts with the major meatpacking companies and challenged IBP at their Fort Dodge 
plant--from organizing workers in their newest operation. Despite IBP‟s efforts, the 
existence of well-established union activity in Sioux City quickly had an impact on 
events at the Dakota City plant. In June 1969 Dakota City IBP workers voted to scrap the 
original, company-approved union and to join the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and 
Butcher Workmen of North America (AMCBW), which had recently merged with the 
declining UPWA. The Dakota City plant was incorporated into the existing local in Sioux 
City (#222), providing the union workers with immediate access to experienced 
organizers and negotiators as well as other useful resources.  
The first of many labor disputes at Dakota City devolved into a strike just two 
months after that vote when, on August 25, 1969, 1,200 union workers walked out.
23
 The 
union was asking for a wage increase from $2.73/hour for slaughter employees and 
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$2.12/hour for processing employees to $3.53/hour for both categories. With their recent 
labor dispute at Fort Dodge in mind, IBP officials interpreted the move as an attempt by 
the national union to drive the upstart company out of business, but IBP offered a 30-cent 
pay increase nevertheless.
24
 The union declined that offer. Distrust quickly developed 
between the two sides as the union saw IBP as hostile to organized labor and IBP saw the 
union‟s efforts as attacks on the company‟s very existence. Each side‟s beliefs about the 
motives of the other created increasing strain on relations and made a negotiated 
reconciliation unlikely. The dispute turned violent in October when striking workers shot 
two women; the one who worked at IBP was wounded and the other, unaffiliated with the 
company, was killed. Strikers also dynamited homes (including the sheriff‟s), 
construction equipment, and a power sub-station that supplied electricity to the plant.
25
  
In November, a picketer from Sioux City was shot by an IBP employee leaving his shift 
after an argument at the entrance to the plant.
26
 Despite all the trouble at the Dakota City 
plant, the company‟s sales were $675 million in 1969, a 26 percent increase over the 
previous year.
27
 
In April 1970, negotiations between union representatives and IBP executives 
yielded an agreement providing slight wage increases spread over the three years of the 
new contract. IBP was able to maintain a split in the wage scale between slaughtering and 
processing despite union opposition. This was significant because they were able to pay 
processors (the workers doing the recently deskilled jobs and also the majority of the 
workforce) about 60 cents an hour less than the slaughterers, who were still treated as 
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skilled workers.
28
 The level of violence associated with this first strike at Dakota City 
was not repeated in later years, but labor disputes turned into strikes or lockouts 
regularly, each time the existing contract was set to expire: 1973 (lockout), 1977-78 
(strike), 1982 (strike), and 1986-87 (lockout, then strike). 
In addition to establishing what would become a pattern of labor unrest, the 1969 
strike was the first instance where IBP specifically recruited Latino workers to meet their 
labor needs--in this case as strikebreakers. Nebraska was a “right-to-work” state, having 
passed legislation following the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act which prohibited closed shops. 
Employees could not be required to be union members or pay union dues. This allowed 
IBP to continue operations with some non-union employees who chose not to participate 
in the strike and to recruit new workers as well to try to make up for the striking 
employees. The company managed to return operations to about 50 percent of pre-strike 
levels with this combination of non-union employees and strikebreakers. In an interview 
with the South Sioux City Star in October 1969 Arden Walker, vice president of industrial 
relations at IBP, discussed the continuing operations of the plant during the strike. He 
emphasized that most of the replacement workers that the company hired were from 
surrounding Nebraska towns, but also noted that some “Spanish-Americans” had come to 
work in the plant. These workers “are all American citizens and were screened more 
carefully than other employees,” he pointed out in an effort to preempt criticism of the 
company‟s decision.29  
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At least some of these Latino workers were recruited by IBP out of the well-
established migrant labor stream that operated from South Texas to the northern Plains 
and the Great Lakes region. Most often, these workers engaged in contract labor for 
growers who were themselves operating under contract to large food-processing 
corporations. Laborers produced a variety of crops, including tomatoes, cucumbers, and 
sugar beets. This migrant labor system included mostly European immigrants at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, but Mexican and Mexican-American laborers, 
especially from the lower Rio Grande Valley in Texas, were increasingly prevalent from 
World War I onward. Like the European immigrants that had come before them, many 
Latino migrants sought safer, higher paying, and more permanent work in cities and 
towns in the Great Plains and Midwest.
30
 As historian Marc Rodriguez contends, Tejano 
workers were attracted to these communities by “social, economic, and political factors,” 
including employment.
31
  
Early newcomers to Dakota County found opportunities for settled work because 
of the labor dispute between the AMBCW and IBP. Many were favorably impressed by 
the job prospects and the pay. Some of the first recruits encouraged family members and 
others to join them, suggesting that work at the Dakota City plant was a good opportunity 
to settle down and avoid the challenges of migrant farm labor. Not all of the new recruits 
chose to make meatpacking a permanent occupation, however, and instead treated it as 
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just another temporary job among the many they might work for varying periods 
throughout the year. For some, the cold winter was just too much. The family of Norma 
de la O--who was 6 years old when she first came to Nebraska--stayed for about eight 
months when they first came to Dakota City in 1969. Her father preferred migrant work 
to the cold. They returned, however, in 1972 and settled for good despite the weather.
32
 
Reactions to the company‟s move to recruit labor from outside the area in 1969 
were mixed. For the most part, the Latino workers were isolated from the rest of the 
community. Most lived in housing that IBP built on the plant premises and rented to 
workers. They were bused into town occasionally for necessary errands, but spent little 
time in the community.
33
 Most people in Dakota City and South Sioux City hardly saw 
them, let alone had any significant interaction with them, so they were ambivalent. When 
direct interactions did occur, they were often unremarkable. But, the interactions that 
Latino newcomers did remember tended to be of a positive, welcoming nature. Norma de 
la O, for instance, relates a story of a visit to a small local store during the family‟s first 
winter in Nebraska. She accompanied her father to translate for him, as his ability to 
speak and understand English was still quite limited. When she and her father walked in, 
the store manager, seeing that Norma‟s father had no coat, asked if he knew how cold it 
got in the area. When her father responded that he really did not know before they had 
arrived, the manager took off his jacket and gave it to him.
34
 
For others, especially striking workers and their families, the presence of 
“foreign” workers was unwelcome. Some were concerned about the possibility that 
outsiders, whether U.S. citizens, legal immigrants, or undocumented immigrants, might 
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take jobs away from locals. Others felt more strongly and expressed their shock and 
disdain for IBP‟s actions in letters to the local newspaper. One woman vowed to find out 
if the company was breaking any laws in bringing “Mexican people” to work in the 
plant.
35
 
Latino workers who arrived during this tense period in the community‟s history 
might have been tempted to move along as quickly as possible. But the bombs and 
shootings--shocking as they were to residents, old and new--were isolated and, whether 
accurately or not, the press attributed the trouble between the union and IBP to the 
outside influence of national union operatives, rather than local members.
36
 The violence 
stopped as soon as the labor dispute was resolved and residents, though they were a bit 
unsettled by the events, did not consider this strike or subsequent labor disputes as 
particularly divisive in the community.
37
 The immigrants who chose to settle in the area 
saw little reason to fear violence and regarded the community as safe, especially when 
compared to some of the places from which they had come, like Chicago and Los 
Angeles.
38
 There is no indication that they were ever targets of violence because of their 
role as strikebreakers. 
Many of the Latinos who were recruited by IBP when the company needed 
workers to keep operations running during the 1969 labor dispute (as well as subsequent 
strikes) became permanent employees. Some encouraged relatives and friends to join 
them in working at IBP, a phenomenon known as “network recruiting.” The company 
thus attracted new employees from outside the area without having to do any actual 
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recruiting themselves. This process was closely linked with another trend, often referred 
to as “chain migration,” where small groups of migrants or immigrants attract more 
newcomers from their country or region of origin.
39
 In the case of Dakota City and South 
Sioux City, these two processes were nearly indistinguishable. IBP and a few associated 
industries (such as cleaning subcontractors and byproducts processors) were initially the 
only employers in town looking to hire newcomers, so a new migrant was in most cases 
also a new recruit for the company during the 1970s.
 40
 
The ability to speak and understand English was not required to get a job at IBP. 
Workers on the processing line were expected to learn how to do their one or two tasks 
simply by imitating what those around them were doing. In the 1970s, some reported 
being placed on the line within 30 minutes of being hired. They received no formal 
training and felt they must simply figure it out and keep up or lose their jobs.
41
 Lack of 
English-language abilities did prevent processing workers from advancing to higher-
paying jobs as foremen, supervisors, or managers, but IBP could employ non-English 
speaking workers as long as they could learn and perform the repetitive tasks of the 
disassembly line.  
Making Dakota County Home 
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One new arrival to the Siouxland (the term used by locals to describe the region, 
including Sioux City, Iowa as well as South Sioux City and Dakota City, Nebraska and 
the extreme southeast corner of South Dakota) and IBP in 1973 was Emilio Diaz. He had 
moved around frequently after immigrating to the United States from Mexico in 1966, 
spending several years first as a migrant farm laborer on the West Coast, picking crops in 
California, Oregon, and Washington, and then several more years as a railroad worker in 
Chicago. When he started a family, Emilio wanted to settle down somewhere other than a 
big city. He felt unsafe in his own home in Chicago; he disliked the crime and gambling 
that took place in his neighborhood. In short, he was looking for a safe and comfortable 
place where his children could have a chance at a “better life.” Emilio heard from a 
cousin working at the plant in Dakota City that IBP was hiring and he decided that the 
job opportunity was his chance to move his young family out of Chicago.
42
  
Along with his wife, Maria, and their 8-month-old son, Marco, Emilio moved 
from Chicago to Sioux City, Iowa, in 1973. Emilio and Maria both found work on the 
processing line at IBP and, while the work was difficult, they were happy to have steady 
employment. They were not satisfied with life in Sioux City, however. The daily drive to 
work was long and the community did not seem welcoming. The family moved across 
the Missouri River to South Sioux City, Nebraska after a couple of years. Here Emilio 
and Maria found the small-town atmosphere they had been hoping for; it was a safe and 
stable place to raise their family.
43
 
The immigrant population remained small and relatively unobtrusive during the 
1970s, as far as most long-time residents were concerned. The 1970 Census listed only 88 
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“Persons of Spanish Language” living in Dakota County in that year out of a population 
of 13,000. Emilio guessed that there were still only around 100 Latinos living in the area 
when he and his family arrived in 1973.
44
 Most, if not all, of these were IBP employees 
and their families. Many Latino workers continued to live in the housing on the plant 
premises throughout the 1970s, maintaining a very strong link both spatially and in public 
perception between the immigrant population and the meatpacking company. 
This housing complex (derisively called “Taco Town” by some of the locals at the 
time) concentrated most newcomers in about 50 units on the plant grounds, creating an 
ethnic enclave where neighbors made connections and maintained some of their cultural 
traditions. Norma de la O fondly remembers these years of her childhood. The housing 
was not extravagant, but it was comfortable. There were always neighbors getting 
together for one reason or another; they would often clear the furniture out of someone‟s 
living room to make space for gatherings. Even religious ceremonies were conducted in 
these homes in the early 1970s as there were no Spanish-language church services at the 
time at St. Michael‟s, the Catholic parish in South Sioux City. De la O attended a 
wedding in one of the housing units as a child; a Spanish-speaking priest came from 
Omaha to officiate.
45
 Community religious events like this one, even though they may 
have taken place in a small home behind a meatpacking plant rather than in a church, 
helped to sustain cultural traditions while at the same time strengthening the sense of 
community among the recent arrivals. 
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The concentration of many of the new immigrants in IBP‟s on-site housing 
facilitated their cooperation and neighborly connections in accomplishing everyday tasks 
as well. Most of the time, kids who lived in the housing complex walked along the 
railroad tracks to get to school because it was the shortest route to the campus in Dakota 
City. During the winter, however, de la O‟s father would often drive children from the 
neighborhood to school because he had a big truck. Neighbors could also rely on one 
another for necessities like child care, which made adapting to the challenges of 
relocation easier than it would have been without any assistance. There were no formal 
efforts by local government agencies or community groups to assist the newly-arrived 
workers at this time, so cooperation amongst neighbors was one of the few resources they 
had.
46
  
For most of the Latinos who came to Dakota County in the late-1960s and 1970s, 
the changes were dramatic: a new climate, new jobs, and a new community. For everyone 
else in Dakota County, however, the existence of the newcomers barely registered most 
of the time. There were only three Mexican Americans in de la O‟s high school 
graduating class in 1982--the community was still overwhelmingly Anglo and working 
class. Latino workers from the housing complex at the processing plant began to move 
into Dakota City and South Sioux City in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It was daunting 
for some, moving out of what had been a close-knit neighborhood, but after the first few 
families made the move others followed. Low housing prices in the area and the fact that 
many households had two incomes facilitated this process. IBP phased out the on-site 
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housing as families moved to town, repurposing the buildings for storage or other 
needs.
47
  
For the children of IBP‟s Latino workforce, experiences at school constituted their 
most regular and in-depth interactions with other members of the community. Latino 
children attended both the public schools in Dakota City and South Sioux City as well as 
St. Michael‟s, the elementary school of the Catholic parish. Regardless of whether they 
attended public or parochial schools, most reported positive experiences. De la O, who 
attended the public elementary school in Dakota City and then the public high school in 
South Sioux City (Dakota City was too small to have its own high school, so all students 
from that elementary school went on to South Sioux City after 8
th
 grade), remembers 
school as a generally positive experience where she could spend time with her friends. 
Her experiences differed from the norm for Anglo children in the community, however. 
While her parents made an effort to be involved in her schooling by attending school 
functions whenever their work schedules allowed, they were usually unable to participate 
fully because of their lack of proficiency with the English language. As de la O entered 
high school in the late 1970s, she also felt a growing distance from her peers; because her 
family had little interaction with Anglo families in town, she had only a limited number 
of friends who were allowed to visit her home and she was only allowed to visit a few of 
theirs.
48
 
School was crucial to immigrant family success, however. Among the many 
challenges that recent immigrants to northeastern Nebraska faced in the 1970s, language 
was perhaps the most common and persistent barrier for first-generation immigrants. 
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Their children learned English at school, whether they started out in Dakota County or 
had previously attended school in Texas or other U.S. states, as many had when their 
families were engaged in migrant farm labor. Adults, who were more likely to have been 
born and raised in Mexico and therefore have less proficiency with English, lacked access 
to English classes like those that would become common at community centers and 
through social service agencies in the 1990s. Fortunately, children could often serve as 
translators for their parents. At the time, this was vital to the family‟s ability to function 
in town as no services, whether from public agencies or private businesses, were 
available in Spanish.
 49
 
The first Latino immigrants to Dakota County in the late 1960s and 1970s found 
ways to adapt to their new home through family and neighborhood cooperation. Many 
were happy with the job opportunity and community they had found. Although the work 
was difficult, wages in meatpacking (both slaughter and processing) were above the 
national average for food processing and other types of manufacturing in the U.S. With 
two income earners, wages were sufficient to support their families and allow some to 
become homeowners. The 1980s, however, would prove to be a period of significant 
change for the community. IBP‟s wages would stagnate and then decline (when adjusted 
for inflation).
50
 At the same time, the processing line was sped up repeatedly, making 
work not only more difficult, but more dangerous as well. And in the late 1980s, in the 
wake of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act‟s legalization of 3.2 million 
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previously undocumented immigrants, there was a new wave of Latino immigration to 
Dakota County. 
 
 
40 
 
 
Chapter 2 
On the Job: Workers’ Experiences at IBP 
 
Currier Holman, one of the founders of Iowa Beef Packers, listed the company‟s 
goals at the 1970 shareholders‟ meeting. He included providing value for customers, a 
return for investors, jobs for communities, and to “help feed a hungry world.” He also 
claimed that, “By combining the benefits of scale with service, we can add this value at 
no cost to anyone.”1 These goals reflected important societal needs, but there clearly were 
costs--especially for communities and workers. Many of the problems faced by workers 
and the communities in which they lived resulted from the working conditions and the 
consequently high worker turnover rate in the meatpacking industry. Many workers did 
not last long on the production line, so IBP required a constant flow of new workers to 
keep their operation running. When they had exhausted the labor supply in and around 
Dakota County, they had to look elsewhere. 
Throughout changes in the meatpacking industry and mergers and acquisitions, 
attitudes expressed by IBP executives toward the communities that were home to their 
packing and processing plants seemed to differ depending on who they were talking to. In 
a 1980 interview with the Des Moines Register, IBP chairman and chief executive officer 
Robert Peterson made it clear that the company had little interest in portraying itself as a 
community-oriented enterprise: “We do not spend a great deal of our time in civic 
functions. We spend it on business. Our primary role in every community we're in is to 
deposit the payroll. Companies that liken themselves to civic ambassadors end up not 
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serving the business purposes they're supposed to.”2 In testimony before the Employment 
and Housing Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations in 1987, 
however, when IBP was being scrutinized for underreporting injuries in the Dakota City 
plant, Peterson conveyed a different message:  
I believe that you will find that our corporation, and our parent corporation 
[Occidental Petroleum], have worked very hard at being both good corporate 
citizens and U.S. citizens, and I know of no industry that has contributed more to 
society….We give to libraries, we‟ve given to universities, we‟ve given to 
swimming pools, we‟ve given to hospitals. . . . We live generally in small rural 
communities, and we give a lot to the communities in which we live both from a 
work standpoint, from our individual contribution standpoint, and from a 
company standpoint.
3
 
 
Notwithstanding such protestations, the company‟s record suggests that its role in 
communities was primarily about business. The company did occasionally make 
donations to local causes, but their primary contribution to the local community was 
providing employment and increasing economic activity in what were otherwise decaying 
rural areas. Jobs in IBP‟s slaughter and processing operations in Dakota City were not 
ideal, however.  
Difficult working conditions at IBP‟s Dakota City plant were central to the very 
phenomenon of immigration as well as the experiences of workers. The turnover rate in 
the industry was responsible for creating the demand for labor that attracted immigrants; 
without the processing plant, the area‟s population would have likely declined as most 
other rural counties‟ populations did during the 1980s. But the same conditions that 
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created turnover and made jobs available for newcomers to Dakota County also made 
working for IBP a burden.  
The difficulty and danger associated with working in meatpacking was central to 
the experiences of nearly all immigrants to Dakota County in the late twentieth century. 
Work occupied a significant portion of their time and the physical demands and effects of 
their labor (i.e. soreness, numbness, pain, and exhaustion) remained even after they 
clocked out and went home. Immigrants‟ employment options were often limited by lack 
of formal education, job skills, and language skills. Thus the packing plant was at the 
same time the only chance new arrivals had for a job and also a source of new problems 
ranging from stress and financial difficulty to serious health conditions. Workers and 
government officials offer evidence of some of the costs that workers and communities 
paid to produce cheap meat for consumers and high profits for IBP. 
Conditions in the Plant  
Slaughtering animals and cutting them up into marketable products is an 
inherently messy and unpleasant task. On top of the nature of the task, the thin profit 
margin of the packing industry made speed and efficiency of paramount importance--
volume was the only way to make money.
4
 Mechanization and deskilling of the 
production process, as IBP began to implement in earnest in 1961, allowed the company 
to continue to increase speed by giving each worker responsibility for repetitive tasks 
while simultaneously cutting wages and benefits. The result was that workers were 
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pushed to--and in many cases beyond--the limits of their physical capacity for wages that, 
while substantial in the 1960s and 1970s, declined thereafter. 
The growth of labor unions in the early twentieth century and increasing 
workplace regulations over the years had helped to put an end to some of the dangerous 
conditions and practices that had been exposed by Upton Sinclair‟s The Jungle in 1906, 
but the speeding up of the production line continued unabated in the late twentieth 
century.
5
 As IBP and its imitators reshaped the industry through increased mechanization 
and the deskilling of tasks, the workforce changed as well to include more people with 
limited education and often lacking English language skills. New workers presented new 
challenges as well. For many immigrants, the dangers of the workplace stood in their path 
to economic and social stability. The segmentation of the labor market kept Latinos and 
other immigrants in the lowest paying and most dangerous jobs. Their lack of transferable 
skills often prevented advancement to safer, higher-paying positions or jobs in other 
industries.
6
  
 Injury and illness rates in meatpacking were remarkably high during the late 
twentieth century. For instance, the rate was 33.6 per 100 full-time workers in 1977, 
putting meatpacking at over three times the average for the private sector as a whole. This 
rate fluctuated no more than a few points per year during the following decade. By 1992, 
the situation was worse. The rate for meatpacking had spiked to 44.4 incidents per 100 
workers. There were many factors that affected injury rates in the industry, but 
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processing line speed was one of the most significant. In the early years of IBP‟s 
operations, each plant slaughtered about 150 cattle per hour, a dramatic increase from the 
roughly 50 per hour in old-line packing plants. By the 1990s, slaughter rates reached 400 
per hour in some plants.  The meatpacking industry made a significant improvement in 
injury rates over the next few years, however, as the rate fell back to 30.3 in 1996. 
Despite this significant improvement in a short period of time, meatpacking remained the 
most dangerous occupation in the United States and had an injury rate over four times as 
high as the average for all private sector industries. By 1999, the rate in meatpacking 
would reach its lowest level in decades at 26.7. 
Table 2.1: Occupational Injury and Illness Rate per 100 Full-time Workers
7
 
Year Meatpacking Private Sector 
1977 33.6 9.3 
1980 33.5 8.7 
1983 31.4 7.6 
1986 33.4 7.9 
1992 44.4 8.9 
1996 30.3 7.4 
1999 26.7 6.3 
 
The high rate of injury and illness in the meatpacking industry requires some 
explanation. The very nature of the work in meatpacking--including the raw materials, 
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tools, and tasks--created a number of difficult circumstances. Lewie Anderson, a United 
Food and Commercial Workers union officer and former IBP employee, provided this 
overview of the working conditions in 1987:  
Workers at the IBP Dakota City plant stand in a sea of blood. Others work in cold 
temperatures of 25 to 35 degrees with powerful fans blowing cold air down on 
them. Nearly all of the workers stand on treacherously slippery floors covered 
with animal fat buildup, which provides a situation where workers slip frequently 
at the IBP Dakota City plant. The working conditions are cramped. Lines of 
people stand side by side with approximately 48 inches of working space between 
them. All of the workers or nearly all of the workers at the IBP Dakota City plant 
wield razor-sharp knives and power tools, frantically working at a pace, trying to 
keep up with a relentless chain bringing production to their work station. Because 
of the close working conditions, because of the breakneck chain speeds, workers 
frequently are accidentally stabbed by their neighbors who are also trying to keep 
up with the chain speed and tolerate the close working conditions.
8
  
 
Sharp knives, cold temperatures, and blood and animal fat are unavoidable features of 
work at meatpacking plants. When workers complained, however, they focused not on 
these parts of the job, but rather the fact that IBP failed to take simple steps to minimize 
the inherent risks and dangers. 
“The floors at IBP are treacherous,” explained former employee Steve DeRaad, 
“[it] was covered with fat smears and was wet.”9 On numerous occasions, employees and 
union stewards would request that management increase the application of salt to the 
floors or distress the concrete to improve traction. In some cases, IBP agreed to apply 
more salt. In others, however, they denied these requests for different reasons. One 
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common response was that they already salted the floors. Another was that providing 
better traction by roughing up the concrete floors would make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to satisfy USDA inspectors that the plant was clean enough to operate.
10
 
Grooves or other irregularities in the floor which would aid traction would also be harder 
to adequately clean and sanitize than smooth floors. IBP‟s fear of failing to meet USDA 
standards (for which the plant could be shut down until the problem was corrected) and a 
more general desire to keep production moving made it difficult for workers, even with 
the help of the union, to get improvements in their working conditions. 
In numerous cases, ineptitude and disregard for worker safety on the part of 
management and supervisors compounded the inherently dangerous physical conditions. 
In 1982, when a worker‟s hand was cut off and it went past fellow employees down the 
line, they were simply told to “clean it up and get back to work.” When a worker got a 
hand caught in a belt roller on the line, nobody in the production area, including the 
foreman, knew where the shutoff switch was located.
11
 In these cases, as in many others, 
the danger of the job was compounded by the driving focus on productivity, which often 
meant worker safety was compromised and even traumatic events were treated as nothing 
more than interruptions to the flow of production. 
Steve DeRaad recalled a particular situation at the end of his shift working with a 
giant blender that repeatedly caused injuries but was never corrected by management. 
“Removing the auger was suppose [sic] to be a two-man job, but in the past few years, 
due to costs I would imagine, Iowa Beef has seen fit to make it a one-man job.” On April 
17, 1985 he slipped on the floor while trying to remove the 300-pound auger by himself 
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and injured his back when he slammed into a steel peg. Less than two months later, on 
May 30, he smashed a finger attempting to remove the same auger, again with no 
assistance. This second injury was caused, in part, by a faulty jack handle that DeRaad 
had repeatedly asked to have repaired. Even after months of complaints, no repair was 
made.
12
 
Joseph Eck‟s case neatly encapsulates what went wrong at the Dakota City plant. 
He was 18 years old and in his third week of work at IBP in January 1985 when he was 
put on a new job which consisted of catching 70-pound chunks of shrink-wrapped meat 
off of one line and placing them in boxes before placing them on another line. The box 
line was broken from the day he started the job, making it difficult to keep up as the 70-
pound pieces of meat continued to come down the line at the standard speed while the 
boxed product had to be moved down the line manually. When pieces of meat backed up 
at the bottom of the shrink-wrapping line, they started to fly off the bottom of the 
conveyor where he was supposed to catch them. Hunks of meat struck his leg repeatedly 
over the course of several days. Eck‟s foreman refused to give him a pass to see the nurse 
about his leg, but he was able to go during his break. The nurse gave him an Ace bandage 
and sent him back to work. He kept going back to the nurse, and by the end of the week 
she concluded that he should not return to his station. The foreman told her to send him 
back anyway. The plant doctor only worked on site one or two days a week and was 
unavailable, so Eck went back to work. He “needed to make the money,” so, despite the 
professional opinion of the nurse and his own fear, he continued to work. Finally, “[a] 
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direct hit to [his] knee by a piece of meat popped the kneecap and it was all over.” Eck 
was fired by the foreman that day.
13
  
Eck‟s injury, like most at the plant, resulted from a number of factors that were 
under the control of IBP. First, he was never trained for the job he was given. Second, 
malfunctioning and improperly maintained equipment made his job harder and more 
dangerous. Third, his attempts to seek treatment through the plant‟s medical personnel 
were thwarted by a manager who valued keeping production moving above worker health 
and safety. Finally, the need to earn a living and fear of being fired prevented Eck from 
walking away while he still could. 
 The damage Eck suffered was not limited to the loss of his job or temporary pain. 
After losing his job at IBP, his doctor diagnosed trauma to a vein in his leg, which caused 
clots and permanent damage. He described the enduring consequences of his 3-week stint 
in the packing house, concluding, “Now my doctor warns me that he is worried that I am 
going to lose the leg. He says if the deterioration continues as it is--I no longer have much 
feeling in my leg, much movement, and I can‟t feel it as it touches the ground--I could 
lose it within the next 5 years. In fact, it might not even last that long.”14 He had seven 
different jobs in two years after his injury, but struggled to keep any position because of 
the lingering medical problems of his brief employment as a packinghouse worker. IBP 
denied that the injury was work-related, contesting the initial decision of the Nebraska 
Workers‟ Compensation Court which found that it was. The company also hired “a 
private detective to film this worker [Eck] and his girlfriend to prove to the media that he 
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really was not injured at all.” The Nebraska Workers‟ Compensation Court decided in 
Eck‟s favor, affirming that his injury was work-related.15 
In 1986 Celsa Peña, who was on light duty due to tendonitis, was reassigned to a 
job that was not supposed to aggravate his injury. The supervisor placed him at the end of 
conveyor belt, where he used a hook to pick pieces of meat and fat off the line. As the 
conveyor turned over at the end of the line, the slots in the belt opened up as it went 
under the table to return. When his hook got caught in one of the slots, Peña‟s finger tips 
were cut off. Production continued while a few cleanup workers searched for the missing 
fingers in the pile of fat and meat on the floor. Despite the proven danger of placing 
workers in this particular position, IBP foremen continued to assign people to work there 
even after this accident.
16
 
 Some workers injured at the Dakota City plant were not employed directly by 
IBP. The company contracted out some portions of their operations, including the 
cleanup that took place overnight after the two production shifts. These workers 
frequently handled dangerous cleaning chemicals and had to manipulate the same 
machinery that production workers operated in order to get everything clean. Cleaning 
workers were underprepared for the tasks they took on. They had no training to operate 
the machines, they had no training in the safe handling of cleaning agents, and they were 
often poorly supervised.   
Two of the most extreme cases of workplace injuries at the Dakota City plant 
involved these subcontracted employees. In August 1981, Rene Nuñez, a 19-year-old 
working for the overnight cleaning contractor, climbed into a meat blender in order to 
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clean it. The sign warning people not to enter the blender was printed in English-- Nuñez 
could not read it. Another worker, unaware that Nuñez was inside and also unable to read 
English, turned on the machine. Nuñez‟s legs were cut off. It took rescuers 40 minutes to 
get him out of the blender: he died several days later in the hospital.
17
 In December 1981, 
just a few months after Nuñez died cleaning the Dakota City plant, another cleanup 
worker met a similar fate. Juan Castro Hernandez, 23, was caught and mangled by 
machinery while trying to clean around and under a processing line. Other workers found 
his body several hours later; he had long since bled to death.
18
 
Consequences of Dangerous Working Conditions 
In many cases, workers‟ problems had only begun when they were injured at IBP. 
They struggled to get access to timely, appropriate medical care. Many were further 
injured when they were put back to work without adequate time or treatment necessary to 
recover. IBP had a poor record of protecting their workers from injury, but their treatment 
of injured employees after the fact was often equally harmful. A nurse who worked for 
IBP for three months in the 1980s reported being pressured by management to keep 
injury numbers low and being overruled by the plant Safety Director on decisions to send 
workers to the hospital. She “became convinced that [she] could not, in good faith as a 
professional Registered Nurse, do what I.B.P. wanted [her] to do.”19 
In October 1986, a beef lugger slipped and fell, dislocating his knee. He was 
placed on a stretcher and taken to the nearest nurse‟s station where the nurse quickly 
called for an ambulance to take the injured worker to the hospital. A plant supervisor 
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made the nurse cancel the ambulance, however, because the worker had been taken to the 
wrong nurse‟s station. The dispensary nearest where he was working was not the one 
designated for the division in which he worked. The injured man would have to be seen 
by the nurse on the other side of the plant to determine if an ambulance was warranted, 
the supervisor insisted. While the nurse and the supervisor debated, the injured worker 
lay unattended on a stretcher on the floor. Eventually, two other plant supervisors 
happened by the nurse‟s station and allowed the nurse to recall the ambulance, but greater 
attention to protocol than to worker health prevented the timely treatment of his injury.
20
 
In cases of less acute injuries, workers needed a note from their foreman to see the 
nurse, even on their own time, such as during a break. DeRaad said, “It‟s common for 
foremen to say an injured worker can‟t see the nurse because they need people on the 
line.”21 Both Peterson and David LaFleur, IBP‟s group vice president for beef production, 
admitted that the foreman, not the worker, was responsible for that decision.
22
 The 
consequences of this policy could be painful for employees. Elizabeth Pinneke developed 
a cyst in her right hand from the repetitive work she was doing on the line. When she 
asked to see the nurse, her foreman told her she “was being a baby.” It took over a month 
for her to get medical treatment from the plant staff. Pinneke was given repeated hot wax 
treatments for her hand; these lessened the pain temporarily, but were ineffective in 
treating the cause of the pain. Later, the company doctor referred her to an orthopedic 
surgeon who removed the growth.
 23
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 One reasonable solution for workers denied access to treatment by plant medical 
staff--to seek care from their own personal physicians outside of work hours--was 
discouraged by official IBP policy. Specifically, the company included in its drug and 
alcohol policy the following statement: 
If at any point the employee requests time off for professional medical treatment, 
the leave of absence would be granted subject to substatiation [sic] of the 
treatment and as a condition of continued employment they may be subject to 
future periodic testing to confirm that the employee‟s performance is not being 
impaired due to drugs or alcohol. If an employee refuses to allow a screen to be 
utilized, the employee will be subject to discipline up to and including 
discharge.
24
 
 
IBP‟s explanation for this policy, according to Daniel Foley, vice president for human 
resources at IBP, was that it “allows [the company] to determine whether employees who 
suffered injury or illness necessitating a doctor‟s visit were in any way physically or 
mentally impaired.”25 How drug or alcohol use could have contributed to injuries like the 
growth of a cyst in Pinneke‟s hand, however, is unclear. Whatever the company‟s 
intention, the policy‟s effect was to discourage employees from seeking treatment. For 
many workers, seeking outside treatment was difficult even without this company policy 
due to a lack of medical insurance and limited access to health care providers. IBP 
offered health insurance benefits for employees only after a probationary employment 
period ranging from three months to a year, depending on the particular job and when the 
employee was hired (the length of the probationary period changed on several occasions 
between 1970 and 2000: three months or six months was typical). In addition to the 
financial barrier faced by all low-wage workers, Latino immigrants often faced additional 
                                                 
24
 The policy is reproduced in full in Committee on Government Operations, Hearings (6 May 1987), 203-
204. 
25
 Committee on Government Operations, Hearings (6 May 1987), 193. 
53 
 
challenges in their attempts to access health care because they lacked familiarity with the 
health care system and because of cultural barriers such as language.
26
 
Incidents where managers at the plant demonstrated little concern for the health or 
safety of the workers and instead required rigid adherence to protocol or policy were 
common. Often the result was delayed and inadequate treatment. Such rigidity did not 
always apply, however, when it came to following doctors‟ orders after treatment. In case 
after case, workers were put back on the line or assigned to an alternative “light duty” 
task despite clear prohibitions from plant medical staff or their personal doctors. When 
Steve DeRaad suffered a broken finger on his right hand, his finger was put in a splint 
and the doctor put him on restricted duty for four months. His supervisors disregarded 
this recommendation. “On a number of occasions, a foreman told me to run a machine 
that forced me to use my right hand. I had to remove my splint to do this job,” DeRaad 
said. Fear compelled him to do what he was told: “I thought it was wrong to make me 
break my medical restriction, but I was afraid of losing my job.”27  
DeRaad summed up his understanding of the company‟s treatment of workers 
clearly: “I don‟t think IBP cares about health or safety at all. Its employees are not treated 
like people, but like things used to get a job done.”28 Union official Lewie Anderson 
suggested one rationale, in addition to the relentless focus on production speed, that 
might have led companies like IBP to treat workers as they did. They “have adopted 
medical practices in plants of returning injured workers back to the lines before they are 
healed. They are reluctant to give injured workers light duty work or days off . . . in order 
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to avoid having to put them on the OSHA logs as lost workday cases. In many cases, 
these practices may border on malpractice.”29 Regardless of the company‟s motivation 
for its actions regarding health care and work, the company required a steady flow of new 
workers to replace those who were injured or simply unwilling to continue working under 
the conditions. 
 The low wages, unpleasantness, difficulty, and danger of work in the Dakota City 
plant, as well as the rest of the industry, frequently meant that new employees did not last 
long. Lewie Anderson argued in 1987, “This is a plant where conditions are so bad that 
turnover is close to 100 percent a year. There are over 2,200 … new workers entering this 
plant every year. Most workers quit because the work is hard, but more importantly than 
that, they don‟t want to be crippled and injured like so many of the other workers around 
them.”30 In defense of IBP, CEO Robert Peterson argued that the turnover was not as 
serious as it might sound (2,200 out of 2,800 employees at Dakota City per year). He 
noted, “We don‟t have 2,200 people all on 2,200 new jobs. We have maybe 500, 700, I 
don‟t know the exact number, where the turnover is involved in those rates.”31 Peterson 
was correct. A lot of the jobs at the packing plant were much more stable than an 80-100 
percent turnover rate might imply; many employees worked at the plant for years on end. 
Much of the turnover was in workers who just started at the plant, many of whom lasted 
only a few weeks or months on the production line.  
 Turnover at the plant had far-reaching implications. Union officials contended 
(especially during labor disputes) that IBP encouraged a high turnover rate because it 
saved them money. In Lewie Anderson‟s words: “New workers, they can work for less 
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money; they don‟t have to pay health insurance; they don‟t have to pay holidays; they 
don‟t have to pay vacation to them, because they‟ll probably be gone, they‟ll turn over. 
And so, there‟s a substantial savings for the company to generate work force turnover.”32 
This was not just a union talking point, however. In testimony before the National Labor 
Relations Board in 1984, Arden Walker, vice president for labor relations for IBP at that 
time, addressed the issue of turnover in very similar terms:  
We found very little correlation between turnover and profitability. An employee 
leaves for whatever reason. Generally, we're able to have a replacement 
employee, and I might add that the way fringe benefits have been negotiated or 
installed, they favor long-term employees. For instance, insurance, insurance, as 
you know, is very costly. Insurance is not available to new employees until 
they've worked there for a period of a year or, in some cases, six months. 
Vacations don't accrue until the second year. There are some economies, frankly, 
that result from hiring new employees.
33
 
 In 1987, IBP officials attempted to distance themselves from this view. When 
asked about Walker‟s testimony before the NLRB, Peterson replied: “I wasn‟t aware of 
that. Mr. Walker is no longer with IBP, and I can‟t refute that. Our goal is not to create 
turnover.” He did admit, when Chairman Tom Lantos of the House Subcommittee on 
Employment and Housing of the Committee on Government Operations pressed the 
issue, that IBP did receive a tax credit for training of new hires, that new hires were paid 
less than long-time employees, and that new hires did not receive the same range of 
fringe benefits that established employees received. He contended, however, that those 
cost savings to the company were not enough to cover the loss in productivity of new 
hires: “We do not make money off of our new employees.”34 Daniel Foley, vice president 
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for human resources argued that “turnover is a problem in the entire industry. It is a 
major cost of doing business, and it‟s something that we would love to find a way to 
stop.”35  
While it is unclear how diligently the company worked in its effort to reduce 
turnover, some of the consequences of the high rate of turnover are obvious. For the 
community as a whole, it meant that people were frequently in and out of work. Often 
injured workers would leave the employ of IBP only to return when they had recovered 
or needed the income. High turnover also led the company to begin recruiting farther 
afield, first regionally but ultimately focusing their efforts on Mexico, California, and 
Texas. For internal migrants or immigrants who responded to those recruiting efforts and 
came to work in the packing plant, high turnover often meant trying to find a way back 
home or looking for another job in an unfamiliar place shortly after arrival. Within the 
plant itself, it meant that at any given time many of the workers were dangerously 
inexperienced and unfamiliar with their surroundings.
36
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the high turnover rate at IBP brought a constant 
flow of new workers to the plant at Dakota City, who described training for jobs at IBP as 
inadequate, typically consisting of watching videos (not always in a language the worker 
could understand), filling out paperwork, and then being put on the line. Other times, 
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workers were moved from job to job without any training specific to the new task. One 
IBP employee, Joseph Eck, who worked at IBP for 3 weeks in 1985 before being injured, 
recounted it this way: “At the beginning of my third week, I was put on a job that I had 
no idea how to do. I was never trained for this job, and I was supposed to learn by doing, 
learn by watching the guy who has been doing this job.”37  
In 1987 IBP‟s chief executive officer, Robert Peterson, claimed that the company 
provided “extensive safety training for all new workers,” including “several safety films.” 
He did not mention any safety training beyond these videos. Peterson also stressed that 
all workers “are assigned a trainer who works closely with each new employee.”38 In 
defense of the practice of putting new hires on the production line within two days of 
their start, David LaFleur, IBP‟s vice president for beef production, further clarified, 
“They‟re put on the line… along with the experienced employee. They‟re not asked to 
keep up with the pace. They‟re just broken in very slowly.”39 Line workers‟ from Dakota 
City and other plants, however, contradicted this assertion. Much like Norma de la O‟s 
parents reported of their training in 1972, new hires in the 1980s and 1990s repeatedly 
claimed to have been placed on the line next to someone who was supposed to train them 
while also keeping up with the speed of the line. In most cases, the new hire worked too 
slowly to complete his or her share of the work, so the trainer was in fact too busy trying 
to keep up to give any useful instruction. In addition, in at least some cases, the trainer 
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and trainee were unable to communicate verbally due to language differences. The new 
worker simply had to learn by watching and attempt to imitate.
40
 
An investigation published in 2004 suggested that these problems were not 
corrected, even twenty years after serious issues had been identified. Workers 
interviewed for the 2004 study echoed the employee complaints from the 1980s and 
1990s: “They showed us a video and then told us to do what the person next to us was 
doing.” Further, the workers assigned to educate the newcomers complained they were 
not given adequate time to train new workers. Nor were they paid for this added 
responsibility.
41
 
Union Efforts and Congressional Investigations 
For workers in non-union plants during the 1980s, there were few options but to 
keep up with the demanding pace of the work or be replaced. In Dakota City, the United 
Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) provided workers with a means to 
challenge IBP and attempt to improve their working conditions. Nebraska‟s “right-to-
work” law limited the union‟s power somewhat, but workers were able to make changes 
through union grievance procedures and, when they felt it was necessary, they made 
IBP‟s faults public. According to a study concerning health and safety regulatory 
enforcement efforts in Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa from 1989-1998, “evidence indicates 
an extremely weak record of enforcement in the meatpacking industry.” However, there 
was a strong correlation between union presence and the number and type of inspections 
conducted by OSHA or analogous state agencies.
42
 The UFCW Local #222 representing 
workers at Dakota City played an important role in drawing attention to safety concerns 
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and giving workers a way to raise concerns of their own. In one instance, the UFCW‟s 
actions in the mid-1980s brought significant violations of OSHA regulations to the 
attention of that agency, resulting in congressional hearings and, eventually, fines and 
corrective action.  
In the months leading up to a 1986-87 labor dispute at the Dakota City IBP plant, 
the UFCW requested injury logs from the company as part of their research and 
preparations for upcoming contract negotiations. They received a set of injury logs listing 
all injuries at both dispensaries (North and South) in the plant. Later, in response to 
another union request the company provided a separate set of documents, their official 
OSHA 200 logs, which listed only a very small portion of those on the first log. The 
union alleged that IBP officials showed OSHA inspectors this second injury log when 
they came to conduct regular inspections of the plant. Because the injury rate at the 
Dakota City plant, according to this incomplete second set of logs, was below the average 
for all industries in the United States, the plant was not subject to an actual inspection. 
OSHA policy exempted companies from inspection if their injury logs showed below-
average injury rates at this time. In 1987, the Employment and Housing Subcommittee of 
the House Committee on Government Operations called hearings to listen to testimony 
from union officials, IBP employees, OSHA personnel, and IBP officials to determine the 
impact of underreporting of injuries on worker safety.  The end result was that OSHA 
cited the Dakota City plant for more than 40 violations and proposed a $2.6 million fine. 
In addition, IBP was required to sign a settlement agreement requiring them to institute 
60 
 
ergonomic reforms to reduce injuries.
43
 These hearings revealed a great deal about the 
relationship between the company, the union, and the workers.  
Lewie Anderson, a UFCW vice president and former employee at the Dakota City 
IBP plant, suggested that OSHA‟s policy of relying on employer‟s records of injuries to 
determine whether or not to inspect a plant was like “letting the fox guard the hen 
house.”44 He also noted the seriousness and scale of the issue of workplace injuries: “One 
third of all the packing house workers will suffer a serious injury or illness this year.”45 
The astounding rate of injury in the meatpacking industry as a whole was one reason that 
OSHA‟s practice of exempting worksites from inspection based solely on company 
records came into question in this particular industry.  
In his opening remarks, Congressman Joseph DioGuardi of New York noted, 
“Concerns have arisen that as American industry tries to compete . . . there may be an 
incentive to perhaps underreport so that we can be more competitive in the 
marketplace.”46 Many of the House members at the hearings shared the perception, 
whether accurate or not, that IBP may have been willfully masking the problem of 
injuries at the Dakota City plant. Robert Peterson‟s response to these concerns was 
simple: “I believe there were some honest mistakes.”47 
Despite the criticism from the union and the overwhelming evidence of injury 
statistics as well as personal testimony, Peterson maintained that IBP‟s safety record was 
“the best of the best.”48 When Congressman DioGuardi suggested that somebody in the 
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plant, if not Peterson, must have been aware of the problems of underreporting and 
covering up injuries, Peterson shifted the blame away from the company‟s leadership: 
“That could be. It is not part of our management. It may be being espoused by some of 
our hourly workers.”49  
The actions of IBP‟s leaders with regard to injuries, injury reporting, and labor 
relations, however, suggest otherwise. According to Lewie Anderson, “IBP has taken a 
position that they‟re not going to address the problems, the safety problems at the 
bargaining table either.”50 John Pendergrass, Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety 
and Health, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor 
reported IBP‟s reaction to their investigation: “We received a complaint about 
recordkeeping. This was in November. In early December, we attempted to investigate 
that complaint. We were refused entry by IBP. We came back to get into the plant and at 
that point, production had stopped.”51 IBP initiated a lockout on December 14, 1986. In 
January, armed with a subpoena, OSHA gained access to the plant to examine the records 
in question. Foley suggested in his testimony that IBP denied OSHA access to the plant 
without a warrant because of the labor negotiations that were going on at the time, 
suggesting that the complaint was simply a ploy by the union ahead of scheduled 
negotiations.
52
 
Robert Peterson declined to appear at the initial hearing in March 1987. OSHA 
was in the process of reviewing records at Dakota City, he stated, and “the UFCW . . . 
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has sought to advance its collective bargaining and nationwide organizing strategy by 
involving OSHA in the UFCW‟s labor dispute with IBP.”53 Union officials pointed out 
that their concerns about the multiple injury logs began months before the labor dispute.
54
 
This does not preclude the use of the issue as a bargaining chip or for the purpose of 
garnering media attention, but clearly the problem of underreporting injuries did not 
begin with the lockout in December of 1986 or the subsequent strike in March 1987. 
 At the next hearing IBP officials and their lawyers did appear, under threat of 
subpoena from the committee.
55
 In his testimony, Peterson claimed the company was 
doing its part: “Mr. Chairman, in the 27 years since I joined IBP as a cattle buyer, I have 
seen IBP grow to become the leading producer of fresh beef and pork in the country. We 
have attained this position because we have led the way toward efficient fresh meat 
production. We have also gotten to the top by treating our workers fairly and with proper 
regard for their health and safety.”56 He and his fellow managers blamed all reporting 
errors on misunderstandings, honest mistakes, and hourly workers. They expressed no 
sense of responsibility, nor any remorse, for the injuries or deaths that occurred in IBP‟s 
flagship operation at Dakota City. 
 When Peterson touted the wonderful safety equipment that IBP provided for their 
workers, Chairman Lantos pointed out the hypocrisy of his claims: “Well, let the record 
show, Mr. Peterson, that these OSHA regulations [to require the safety equipment] were 
fought by the industry. They were put in at the insistence of the workers, and I find it 
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somewhat inappropriate to listen to this great display of pride when the company you 
represent fought the introduction of this equipment.”57 
 When former IBP employee Joseph Eck testified before the subcommittee, he 
concluded his remarks by saying: “I have a lot of friends who still work at the plant, and I 
hope that they don‟t end up like me.”58 The odds, sadly, were not on their side. While it 
was certainly a small minority of workers who left the employ of IBP by death or 
dismemberment, many workers sustained injuries that would hinder them for the rest of 
their lives. According to Steve DeRaad, “At the plant, we joke that IBP works you to 
death, until you are hauled out on a stretcher, and then they replace you. It‟s not a funny 
joke. But it shows you IBP‟s attitude.”59  
Repetitive Stress Injuries 
 New issues came to light in the 1980s and 1990s which added to the known 
dangers of work in meatpacking. In addition to the risks posed by sharp knives, slippery 
surfaces, and powerful machines in IBP‟s meatpacking operations, workers‟ repetition of 
individual tasks on the fast-moving processing line often led to repetitive stress injuries. 
New technologies and automation sometimes helped to reduce the physical strain on 
workers, but in other cases these improvements simply led to faster line speeds and more 
stress on certain muscles, tendons, and joints. The Whizard--an electric-powered knife 
with a rotating blade often used by line workers to trim fat from meat or make other cuts-
-was one such innovation that became increasingly popular from the 1970s onward. 
Power knives and saws allowed processing work to be done quickly and efficiently, but 
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the constant vibration of the tools put excessive strain on workers‟ hands and wrists, 
causing numbness, pain, and permanent nerve damage.
60
 
Many IBP employees were not even aware of the existence or seriousness of 
cumulative trauma disorders like carpal tunnel syndrome in the mid-1980s. According to 
IBP‟s records (which were found to chronically underreport injuries of all sorts) 10 
percent of employees had suffered repetitive stress injuries. William Schmitz, chief 
executive officer of UFCW Local #222, suspected that it was even more pervasive. The 
union conducted a survey in 1987 and found that most employees experienced at least 
some symptoms of repetitive stress injuries. The survey also found, according to Schmitz, 
that “Many of the people didn‟t know when we did this survey that the tingling in their 
fingers at night was the early sign of tendonitis. They didn‟t know why their hands were 
going to sleep at night. They thought that numbness and locking and tingling hands was 
just a condition of employment and everybody‟s hands did that.”61 In response to a claim 
by Congressman Tom Lantos that more than half of IBP employees suffered from carpal 
tunnel syndrome, Daniel Foley, IBP‟s vice president for human resources, said those 
figures were “simply incorrect.” He claimed that “under 5 percent of people might have 
some symptom of repetitive motion at some point.” He also suggested that workers 
experiencing numbness, tingling, or other symptoms was like people beginning any other 
physical activity, like a sport. “There is going to be, especially with new workers, a 
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period of time where someone, in building a new muscle, using a muscle that they 
haven‟t before, will go through a period of adjustment.”62 
Ergonomics and cumulative trauma disorders became a contentious issue for 
employees, unions, regulators, and the industry in the 1990s.
63
 In 1990 the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued a set of guidelines specifically 
targeting the meatpacking industry. It suggested that “Finding solutions to the problems 
posed by ergonomic hazards may well be the most significant workplace safety and 
health issue of the 1990s.” It further said that “the incidence and severity of [cumulative 
trauma disorders] and other workplace injuries and illnesses in this industry demand that 
effective programs be implemented to protect workers from these hazards.”64 Despite the 
seriousness this publication seemed to convey, OSHA did not immediately develop an 
enforceable standard. Instead, they recommended that meatpacking companies 
voluntarily follow the guidelines.  
Recommended guidelines proved insufficient to protect workers. In 1998, the 
incidence rate of repeated trauma disorders in meatpacking was 993.5 per 10,000 full 
time workers. The incidence rate for this type of injury for all private industry in the U.S. 
in the same year was just 28.5 per 10,000 workers.
65
 In 1999, nearly a decade after 
identifying repetitive stress injuries as potentially “the most significant workplace safety 
and health issue of the 1990s,” OSHA proposed an official standard. IBP, the American 
Meat Institute (AMI), the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and other 
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businesses and trade groups opposed the proposed standard at public hearings. They then 
filed lawsuits to prevent its implementation after the standard became law in 2000.
66
 
  The dangers of the workplace were an ongoing issue for all meatpacking 
employees throughout the late twentieth century. As safety standards improved in most 
industries, a few industries, like meatpacking, lagged behind. The impact of these dangers 
on the lives of workers cannot be overstated. IBP employees spent a significant portion of 
their time working in these conditions and the effects did not end when they went home 
after each shift. But for Latino immigrants, other challenges outside of the workplace also 
had significant effects on their experiences. 
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Chapter 3 
A Changing Community: Challenges and Opportunities 
 
 The restructuring that IBP pioneered in the meatpacking industry beginning in 
1961 happened within the context of a global shift of industry toward low-wage areas. 
For many industries, this meant moving operations from the United States to countries in 
Latin America, Southeast Asia, India, or China. Meatpacking and other agriculture-based 
industries often relocated to rural areas where wages were lower relative to urban centers. 
Many rural communities welcomed new industry, especially as the 1980s farm crisis 
ravaged local economies.
1
 
 IBP opened several new plants during the 1980s and early 1990s, including one in 
Garden City, Kansas, and one in Lexington, Nebraska. In each of these places, the 
company used labor and production patterns developed at the Dakota City plant. In 
Dakota City, IBP had transformed the meatpacking workforce from one paying a middle-
class wage to one in which even full-time workers experienced financial hardship and 
sometimes had to rely on government assistance or charity to survive. Not only did the 
company move operations from high-wage urban areas to low-wage rural areas, its 
mechanization and deskilling of production operations drove labor costs down even 
further over the course of two decades. From the late 1980s forward, the company‟s 
strategies and the high rate of worker turnover at the plant meant that they increasingly 
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relied on a steady flow of new workers, Latino immigrants as well as Southeast Asian 
refugees, to meet their labor needs.
2
 
 For Dakota City and South Sioux City, this new wave of immigrants beginning in 
the late 1980s created stark challenges. Many aspects of community life were affected: 
churches, schools, housing, law enforcement, local business, and health care. Immigrants 
themselves had to adapt to their new homes, but the communities made significant 
changes as well to adapt to a shifting population. These changes resulted from the 
coordinated efforts of social service agencies and community groups, in some cases, but 
also from the progress made by the earlier immigrants--those who had come to work at 
IBP in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
More New Immigrants 
The immigrant population of Dakota County represented a wide variety of 
individual experiences. Some people moved as parts of families, others individually. 
Sometimes immigration split families apart and sometimes it reunited them. Some 
immigrants found steady employment and, therefore, were able to maintain stable and 
secure households; others were less successful. A few examples illustrate some of these 
changes and continuities in the early 1990s. 
 Many immigrants who arrived in the early 1990s came under circumstances 
similar to those characterizing the newcomers of the late 1960s and early 1970s. For 
example, Marina Galvan moved from Mexico to California in 1990 and then, in 1993, at 
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the urging of her sister who worked at IBP in Dakota City, she moved to South Sioux 
City. Marina‟s sister emphasized that there were not too many people in the area and that 
there was little crime and no gangs. Marina hoped that her young children would be safer 
and have better opportunities in such a place. IBP hired Marina to work at the processing 
plant, where she trimmed fat and removed bones from meat on the production line. The 
work was difficult, but she was happy to find that her new neighbors were much quieter 
than those she had left behind in California. The work that she did in Dakota City was not 
an improvement over the various low-paying, dead-end jobs she had worked in 
California, but the new community was much more livable than the old.
 3
 
 Paola Velasco experienced common features of Mexican immigration to the 
United States in two different stages. First, her husband José began working at IBP in 
1987, but she and their four children remained in Guadalajara, Jalisco. José sent 
remittances to support his wife and children and visited them once or twice a year. In 
1994, Paola and the children moved north to join José. In this second stage of her 
immigration experience, Paola was happy to have her immediate family back together. 
However, at first it was difficult for her to adjust to the new surroundings. In Mexico, she 
was used to having many relatives--including her parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, and 
cousins--nearby and seeing them regularly for all sorts of occasions. In Nebraska, they 
had no extended family and so Paola felt disconnected from the surrounding community. 
Eventually, she says, her family became friends with other Mexicans as well as 
Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and others who lived in their neighborhood or whom they met 
in English classes. These new relationships served some of the same purposes that 
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extended family had in Guadalajara--people to socialize with, primarily, but also to help 
them when necessary with things like child care.
4
 
 Juan Gutierrez moved to South Sioux City to work at IBP in 1993, leaving his 
wife and children behind in Guatemala. He found the work at the packing plant 
challenging, especially as the processing line seemed to move faster and faster. Even 
though he was tired and sore each day after work, he was glad that he earned enough 
money to support his family; this would have been much more difficult to do had he 
stayed in Guatemala, where there were few opportunities for employment. He considered 
Nebraska a beautiful and easy place to live compared to his native country.
5
  
 Duc Tran and his family left Vietnam in 1992 after he was released from prison. 
They settled in Sioux City, Iowa, as refugees and Duc was hired at IBP less than a week 
after his arrival. Although work at the packing plant was physically difficult, compared to 
life in Vietnam (where it was sometimes difficult even to feed his family and where he 
was imprisoned for political reasons) Duc, like Juan Gutierrez, found life in the United 
States was easy.
6
 
It is important to note that the immigrant community was not composed entirely 
of families or permanent settlers as these examples might suggest. Because of the danger 
and difficulty of work in the meatpacking industry, many newcomers did not stay in 
Dakota County but moved on in search of better opportunities elsewhere. These transient 
workers left little record or indication of their experiences in the area, but the attitudes of 
immigrants and other community members suggest that most perceived a difference in 
                                                 
4
 Paola Velasco, interview with Dustin Kipp, 17 November 2010. 
5
 Juan Gutierrez, interview with Dustin Kipp, 17 November 2010. 
6
 Duc Tran, interview with Dustin Kipp, 17 November 2010. 
71 
 
desirability between those who settled as families in northeastern Nebraska and those--
often single men--who were itinerant.
7
 
 For the new wave of immigrants who arrived in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
resources provided by the existing Latino community in Dakota County, such as 
businesses, religious life, and opportunities for language instruction, helped in the process 
of successful integration into the community.
8
 It is important to keep in mind, however, 
the varieties of experience: immigrant assimilation and incorporation were not “straight-
line” processes wherein all newcomers went through a similar pattern of challenge and 
change.
9
 Rather, factors such as socioeconomic status, family composition, and 
immigration status meant that the processes as well as the outcomes differed 
considerably, even amongst the immigrant population of a single community. 
 Individual or family immigration status was one of the most important factors 
shaping immigrant experience as well as perceptions amongst people in receiving 
communities. As historian Mae M. Ngai suggests, “During the late twentieth century, 
illegal immigration became perceived as the central and singularly intractable problem of 
immigration policy and became a lightning rod in domestic national politics generally.”10 
More than just a political issue, though, immigration status could have a direct effect on 
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immigrant experience and opportunities. Throughout the United States during the last 
decades of the twentieth century, undocumented immigrants were frequently hired for the 
least-desirable jobs because they were unlikely to complain about conditions or pursue 
compensation if injured on the job. They also earned less than their counterparts who had 
documentation of their immigration status.
11
 
 Immigrants without documentation and their family members occupied a unique 
position in society: their presence was desired by some, especially for purposes of labor, 
but their very presence was also categorized as a violation of the law which precluded 
them from receiving benefits such as civil rights and social welfare accorded to other 
members of society. Mixed-status families (often undocumented parents and children 
who are U.S. citizens by birth) faced complex issues as well. While members of the 
family with proper legal documentation may have been entitled to certain rights and 
benefits, they were less likely to claim them if doing so risked exposing family members 
who lacked such documentation to scrutiny. 
Change in Dakota County 
Beginning in the early 1990s Dakota Avenue, the main thoroughfare of South 
Sioux City‟s business district, gained immigrant owned businesses year after year.12 
Establishing a business was frequently a long-term process for the families involved, 
many of whom had come to work at IBP in the 1970s. One advantage that immigrant 
families had over single immigrants was the ability to earn multiple incomes. It was 
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common for families with two earners to use one paycheck for immediate expenses while 
saving the second for future investment in a home or a business. This approach allowed 
the Diaz family to buy several houses during the 1980s when, according to Emilio, 
houses were “cheap.” Income from these rental properties, added to Emilio and Maria‟s 
incomes from IBP, improved the family‟s ability to save even more.13 
In 1995, Emilio and Maria used the savings from their rental properties and their 
years of work at IBP to buy a combination bar and liquor store on the north end of 
Dakota Avenue. They quit their jobs at IBP and expanded their newly acquired business, 
converting it into a restaurant and bar. Their oldest son Marco--after serving in the 
military and completing his college education--came to work with them in the family 
business.
14
  
The language barrier continued to be one of the most common challenges faced 
by new arrivals to Dakota County in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The growing number 
of immigrant-owned businesses that catered to the Spanish-speaking population in 
general as well as to specific needs of the Latino community (as well as the Southeast 
Asian community and, later, other immigrant groups as well) decreased the need for new 
arrivals to learn English. By the early 1990s, a grocery store, a bakery, restaurants, and 
other stores provided access to culturally significant goods and services that had been 
unavailable in the area for most of the previous two decades, and they conducted business 
in the consumers‟ native languages. In addition to the specific benefits of these small 
businesses, the number of bilingual residents in the community increased in general. 
Banks, medical centers, and other local institutions increasingly adapted to the changing 
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population in the community by hiring employees who could serve customers in 
languages other than English.
15
 Despite this progress, some essential services continued 
to require English proficiency or a translator. For instance, South Sioux City‟s City Hall 
lacked any Spanish-speaking staff in 2000, even though the Latino population made up 
nearly 25 percent of the community and many were unable to speak English well.
16
 
At least two religious communities in South Sioux City, St. Michael‟s (the 
Catholic church) and the First Baptist Church, offered weekly services in Spanish by the 
late 1980s. St. Michael‟s began to offer Spanish services in 1982 and also instituted a 
Hispanic Committee to consider the specific needs of the Spanish-speaking and 
immigrant communities. Both of these religious communities served as important cultural 
institutions for the Latino population of the area, including those who had lived in the 
area for a decade or more as well as the influx of new arrivals in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. In addition to regular worship services, these religious communities provided 
opportunities for social interaction and assistance for basic needs like food and clothing. 
For instance, the First Baptist Church built a new church in 1989 and converted the old 
building into a food pantry to help struggling members of the community.
17
 While the 
addition of Spanish-language services made religious practice easier for the Latino 
community, it should be noted that separate clergy operating separate services also 
created a divide within these congregations that may have limited opportunities to foster 
integration and adaptation between newcomers and established residents. 
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In another effort to adapt to the growing Latino population in the early 1990s, the 
cable television provider in the area began carrying Univision, the largest Spanish-
language network in the United States.
18
 Of course, for many families struggling to pay 
for basic necessities, cable television was not within economic reach. Nevertheless, it is 
significant that the Latino population at this time became a demographic large enough to 
attract the interest of businesses that served the area.  
Members of the growing Latino population were interested in learning English as 
well as having access to services in their native languages. In response to increased 
demand for language classes, Northeast Community College in Norfolk, Nebraska, began 
offering English as a Second Language (ESL) classes in 1991 with cooperation from 
South Sioux City, who provided space in City Hall and later in the public library for these 
classes. According to Lance Hedquist, the City Administrator of South Sioux City, the 
city government advocated for new immigrants to the area to learn English and the city 
facilitated that process when possible. The problem for many new arrivals to South Sioux 
City, however, was that even when ESL classes were available, it was difficult to find the 
time or energy after work and family responsibilities to attend classes, study, and practice 
new skills. These barriers were often higher for female immigrants who had more 
responsibilities for family and home after their regular workday.
19
  
 For new arrivals to Dakota County, the issue of language continued to be one that 
hindered adults. Eighty percent of those identified as “Do not speak English „very well‟” 
in the 1990 Census were 18 years old or older. Young children, on the other hand, were 
able to learn English in school--even if they arrived in the community with limited or no 
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proficiency. This process was decidedly more difficult for children the older they were 
upon arrival. The challenges of learning the language and attempting to fit it were enough 
to shape a child‟s perception of school. Those who arrived at an older age found their 
educational experiences more difficult than those who started learning English and 
adapting to a new peer group at a younger age.
20
 
As languages other than English became more prevalent in Dakota County and 
the difficulties of conducting daily business were ameliorated for many immigrants, some 
Anglo residents became increasingly annoyed by the growing presence of foreign 
languages in their community. For some, even signs or advertisements in Spanish or 
Vietnamese in the stores along Dakota Avenue provoked anger.
21
 In addition to the 
simple increase in volume of new immigrants beginning in the late 1980s, the resentment 
that some Anglos felt was also the product of the perception that new immigrants to the 
area received certain advantages, such as bilingual instruction at school, that were not 
provided to immigrants (or their children) in the early twentieth century. One woman 
who grew up during the Depression in South Sioux City, herself a child of European 
immigrants, recalled the difficulties of her childhood and the hard work that her parents 
undertook to learn English and adapt to their new home. She noted that, in contrast to her 
family‟s experience, “they hand out so many things nowadays,” to new immigrants.22 
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Community organizations, government agencies, and community members did 
begin to recognize and address some of the needs of the immigrant community in the late 
1980s. At their September 1986 meeting, the South Sioux City school board recognized 
that a number of students in the district were not proficient in English. The board decided 
to hire a full-time aide to work with these individuals specifically on language skills so 
that they could later be incorporated into standard-curriculum classes. It was not a 
unanimous decision, however, as the board split 3-2. Although the district had English 
language learners at all grade levels, the board decided to focus its efforts primarily on 
the elementary school level because, according to the school‟s superintendent, “there 
[wasn‟t] much that [could] be done for those students who [had] reached the Junior and 
Senior High School levels.” He also noted that the number of non-English speakers was 
holding steady at about 40 each year throughout the district.
23
 
 Just over a month later, at the school board‟s next meeting in October 1986, the 
situation had changed enough to warrant reconsideration. This time, the board voted 
unanimously to approve the hiring of an additional aide to work with English language 
learners at the secondary level. Whereas the superintendent had said in September that 
the number of students requiring English language instruction outside of the normal 
curriculum was holding steady at around 40, Jeannette Borich, the district‟s lone ESL 
instructor reported in October that the number of ESL students was up to 60 and 
“increasing almost daily.”24 
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 Union representatives also had to adapt to changes as immigration to the 
community increased. The United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) that 
represented workers at IBP after the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen 
of North America (AMCBW) merged with the Retail Clerks International Union in 1979 
had to adjust to language and cultural differences as the workforce it represented 
changed. According to Marv Harrington, a longtime IBP employee and union official, 
there was no lasting animosity toward immigrants who came to work in the plant as 
strikebreakers. After each of the labor disputes during the 1970s and1980s was resolved, 
the UFCW was keen to incorporate all workers--even those who started in the plant as 
strikebreakers. The only change the union had to make, Harrington recalled, was to 
“adapt to the translation problems.” Many of the newcomers were strongly pro-union and 
quickly joined. They also participated in subsequent walkouts and strikes alongside their 
Anglo counterparts. Harrington said that incorporating immigrants into the union was not 
difficult and that the union and the newcomers “adapted at the same time together.” The 
union recognized bilingual workers as a resource and they became union stewards and 
officers in the late 1980s, which helped to ease the transition for newly arriving workers 
by offering assistance on the job in their native languages. Sioux City‟s Local #222, and 
Harrington specifically, were also involved in a UFCW International effort to better 
consider the particular issues and interests of Hispanic workers. This effort culminated in 
the 1987 creation of the United Hispanics of the UFCW, a special council dedicated to 
the pursuit of those interests.
25
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While the UFCW made some efforts to help new recruits adapt to work at IBP, it 
is notable that after the frequent labor disputes of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the 1990s 
saw no such actions. The UFCW continued to negotiate labor contracts and advocate for 
the interests of the plant‟s workers, but IBP‟s willingness and ability to recruit labor from 
outside the local community undercut the union‟s former power. 
Adaptation to Change 
By the late 1980s, OSHA investigations, congressional hearings, and Bureau of 
Labor Statistics data had all demonstrated the hazards of working in the meatpacking 
industry. Despite all that was known about these dangers, meatpacking remained one of 
the most dangerous industries in the United States, with little improvement in safety 
throughout the 1990s. In 1996, the lost-workday injury and illness rate for meatpacking 
was 30.3 percent, over four times the rate for the private sector and just 3 percentage 
points lower than it had been in 1977.
26
 The difficulty and danger of the work as well as 
the low wages and lack of opportunities for advancement remained among the most 
significant challenges for new immigrants.
27
 
It was not uncommon for workers to arrive in town with few or no resources. 
Those recruited from out of state frequently invested what little they had to move to 
Dakota County and then lived paycheck to paycheck. For some, the real trouble began 
when one was injured on the job or simply unable to meet the physical demands of the 
packinghouse. Immigrants in this situation had no job, few job skills that were in demand 
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in the area, and often not enough money to get back to their previous homes. Social 
service agencies provided assistance for housing, clothing, and nutrition in many cases. 
Sometimes they simply offered such workers enough money for return transportation.
28
 
For some new immigrants, finding a place to live was one of the first challenges 
faced upon arrival. Although housing prices in the 1980s were low relative to many other 
parts of the country, the availability of housing in South Sioux City and Dakota City was 
simply inadequate to handle the growing population during the late-1980s and early 
1990s.
29
 Some of the packing plant workers lived across the Missouri River in Sioux 
City, Iowa, where there was a larger pool of housing available. Many others found homes 
in the burgeoning mobile home parks of South Sioux City. Often those who came to 
Dakota County as single workers rather than with families shared housing, frequently 
mobile homes, with other workers. This met their needs for shelter and also allowed them 
to save more of their paychecks either for remittances or for future needs. This practice 
was unsettling to some members of the community simply because it did not conform to 
common housing practices in the area.
30
  
The influx of new immigrants in the late 1980s and early 1990s strained 
community services as well. New arrivals frequently came to the area with few resources 
and few, if any, social connections. For these immigrants, any disruption of their planned 
                                                 
28
 de la O. 
29
 Harrington; Emilio Diaz. 
30
 Harrington; de la O; South Sioux City (Dakota County, Nebr.) City Directory (Kansas City, Missouri: 
R.L. Polk & Co., 1993). Housing shortages and adaptations to overcome them were common in 
communities experiencing rapid immigration at this time. See Susan Blank, “Hearth and Home: The Living 
Arrangements of Mexican Immigrants and U.S.-born Mexican Americans,” Sociological Forum 13 (Winter 
1998): 35-59; Lourdes Gouveia and Donald D. Stull, “Dances with Cows: Beefpacking's Impact on Garden 
City, Kansas, and Lexington, Nebraska,” in Any Way You Cut It: Meat Processing and Small-Town 
America, by Donald D. Stull, Michael J. Broadway, and David Griffith, 85-108, (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1995); Mark A. Grey, “Storm Lake, Iowa, and the Meatpacking Revolution: Historical 
and Ethnographic Perspectives on a Community in Transition,” in Unionizing the Jungles: Labor and 
Community in the Twentieth-Century Meatpacking Industry, by Shelton Stromquist and Marvin Bergman, 
242-262, (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1997). 
81 
 
employment at IBP or any unforeseen expenses could be catastrophic because they had 
no savings and no support network. Organizations like the South Sioux City Community 
Center and local churches made efforts to help new arrivals with basic needs, but even 
simple supplies like clothing and blankets were scarce at times. When formal 
organizations were unable to cope with the needs of new immigrants, the old system of 
reliance on neighbors and family sometimes helped to bridge the gap. Norma de la O 
related one such story from when she was working for Goldenrod Hills Community 
Action, a regional social service agency. A family that had just arrived in Dakota County 
to work at IBP had no home, no money, and nobody to watch their children while both 
parents worked. De la O was unable to help them with childcare in her official work 
capacity, but she did enlist her own mother to watch the family‟s children for the first 
week so the parents would not lose their jobs while they worked out other arrangements 
for childcare.
31
 
 Wage declines and benefit cuts during the 1980s hurt the Siouxland in several 
ways. For one, fewer IBP employees (and there were over 2,800 of them in a county with 
a total workforce of about 8,000) could afford to purchase cars, homes, or other products 
that would drive the local economy. In addition, even meeting basic needs could be 
challenging for one-earner families. A new production line worker at IBP in 1987 earned 
$5.90 per hour. Such a worker would barely clear the poverty threshold for a family of 
four even if he or she worked 40 hours a week every week of the year. (An unlikely 
scenario, anyway, as the high injury rate and occasional slow production periods limited 
                                                 
31
 de la O. 
82 
 
workers‟ opportunities to consistently work that many hours.)32 The shift of meatpacking 
work from a relatively high-wage occupation in the 1970s to a low-wage, often 
temporary, job in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s coincided with a shift to a 
workforce increasingly composed of ethnic minorities--mostly Latinos and Southeast 
Asians.  
One of the results of these two patterns of change was a significant economic 
disparity in Dakota County between Latinos and non-Hispanic whites in 1990. Latino 
families earned, on average, about $10,000 per year less than their Anglo counterparts. 
When tabulated on an individual basis, Latinos were twice as likely to be below the 
poverty line (21.5 percent to 10.6 percent for non-Hispanics). The likelihood of a family 
being in poverty shows an even greater gap: 25 percent of Hispanic families were below 
the poverty line compared to 8.4 percent for non-Hispanic whites. Significantly, this 
economic disparity existed despite a higher level of workforce participation among 
Latinos than Anglos.
33
 
The difficulties of living on a low income were complicated by additional factors 
such as cultural differences and unfamiliarity in a new area. For instance, health care was 
a challenge for both immigrants and health care providers in new destination 
communities. For health care providers, language barriers made providing care more 
difficult and more time-consuming. In addition, newcomers with no health insurance--
workers at IBP in the early 1990s were not eligible for coverage until after 6 months of 
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employment, and many did not last that long--added to uncompensated care costs for 
clinics and hospitals in the area. For the immigrants themselves, barriers to medical care 
included lack of transportation, inconvenient office locations or hours, lack of insurance 
or income, lack of understanding of the healthcare system, and distrust of doctors.
 34
 The 
combination of these factors could make even fairly routine illnesses into major ordeals. 
For Paola Velasco, her first encounter with the health care system was one of the 
most difficult challenges she faced after moving from Mexico to northeastern Nebraska. 
Her children contracted chickenpox in1994. The family lacked medical insurance at the 
time and Paola had to take her children to the emergency room for care. They were able 
to get the treatment they needed, but it was expensive. On top of that, the whole episode 
was unsettling for Paola; she was worried about the health of her children and how they 
would pay the bills. Paola especially missed her support network back in Guadalajara at 
this time.
35
 
 There is little record of overtly racist acts against the Latino population of the 
Siouxland in the 1990s, but anecdotal evidence suggests that it was at least an occasional 
problem. Marina Galvan recalled one incident shortly after her move from California. 
While Marina was visiting her sister‟s house in South Sioux City, a neighbor yelled at her 
for parking her car on the street. The neighbor threatened to call the police and 
immigration authorities, neither of which was particularly frightening to Marina because 
she was a legal resident and had not done anything wrong. Nevertheless, the incident 
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suggests that for at least some residents Latinos were not welcome and not considered or 
treated as legitimate members of the community.
36
 
 More subtle racism was also an issue, though it is difficult to document exactly 
what impact this had in the community. Marco Diaz remembered that when he was 
growing up in the 1980s, newcomers to his school would be treated differently by their 
peers depending on language ability as well as skin color. Latino children with darker 
complexions, he said, were not as readily accepted as those whose skin was lighter. In 
other places in the community as well, such as local businesses, people sometimes 
seemed “uncomfortable” or “apprehensive” when interacting with Marco and his 
parents.
37
  
Like dealings with the community in general, Latino immigrants‟ interactions 
with local law enforcement authorities were generally positive, but there were some 
notable exceptions. Marina Galvan was pulled over by police five times in a one-month 
period in 1994. In each instance, she was asked for her license, registration, and proof of 
insurance. Upon producing these documents, she was allowed to go with no citation or 
warning for any type of traffic violation, suggesting that the only reason she was stopped 
in the first place was the officers‟ suspicion that she may not have had proper 
documentation.
38
 
 One of the common complaints of longtime residents in many communities with 
new immigrant populations in the 1980s and 1990s was that newcomers brought 
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increased crime to their community.
39
 Statistics show increased calls to police 
departments, which often resulted in the hiring of additional patrol officers.
40
 Evidence 
for Dakota County for the late 1980s and early 1990s suggests that a simple answer to the 
question of a connection between immigration and crime is insufficient. By one standard 
measure, the Federal Bureau of Investigation‟s Uniform Crime Reporting Program, the 
crime rate in Dakota County dropped 33 percent between 1986 and 1995, a period when 
many new immigrants were arriving, suggesting that the influx of new immigrants did 
not lead to increased crime. Critics of this measure point out, however, that the Uniform 
Crime Reporting Program only considers serious crimes and ignored increases in 
offenses such as simple assault, drunk driving, and minor drug-related offenses--the 
number of offenses in each of these categories at least doubled during the same time 
period.
41
 
 For most residents, the increase in minor crimes did not alter their views of 
Dakota City and South Sioux City. Both towns continued to be considered safe and 
comfortable places to live and raise a family by both the older Anglo population and 
newcomers. Marina Galvan, for whom low crime was a particular point of attraction to 
the area, was pleased to find that it was much quieter and safer than her former home in 
California.
42
 Many people who had lived in Dakota County their whole lives continued to 
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consider it a safe place, though others were less comfortable with the rising number of 
newcomers.
43
 
 The influx of new immigrants and the associated challenges that characterized the 
late 1980s and early 1990s sparked several responses from within the community. Rita 
Frost of the South Sioux City Community Center organized a meeting of various 
community leaders in 1986 which included Anglos and Latinos, religious and secular, to 
try to coordinate efforts to provide basic social services for new arrivals. Religious 
leaders from various churches in town helped by offering whatever resources they could 
from their congregations. Some community members complained that IBP was not 
shouldering enough of the responsibility for the welfare of their employees. They pressed 
the company, though with little effect, to ensure that their recruits would be able to 
support themselves rather than relying on community social service agencies or charity 
for food, shelter, and clothing.
44
 
In response to such criticism and calls for company contribution to solutions, IBP 
supporters, including some local government officials and the media, pointed to the 
benefits that the plant brought to the community: “Those concerned with funds being 
used to assist new residents coming to this area should look at the long-term benefits in 
taxes being paid by IBP and its workers, by the payroll which has pumped life into the 
Siouxland economy and by the market IBP has provided for area livestock farmers.”45 
Clearly there was disagreement in the community during this period of rapid influx of 
new immigrants over whether the economic development that IBP brought to the 
community was worth the costs paid by established residents and new arrivals alike. 
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 Despite the disagreement over who should bear the costs of IBP‟s labor turnover 
and labor recruiting practices, local leaders continued to work to improve conditions. 
According to Lance Hedquist, South Sioux City‟s City Administrator, it was often 
difficult to get members of the immigrant community involved in this process because 
most were busy working to support their families. The physical strain of working on the 
processing line at IBP meant that most workers were too tired at the end of the day to get 
involved with committee work or other efforts that often took place in the evenings. 
Some immigrants, often those who had arrived in the 1970s and achieved some measure 
of stability by the late 1980s, did get involved, however.  Although their presence in 
community groups and local government was small and grew slowly at first, it was 
significant.
46
 
 Tony Gomez is one example of an immigrant who moved beyond the processing 
line both in terms of work and community involvement. He began working at IBP in 
1971 and worked various jobs in the meatpacking industry until 1986. In 1983 he started 
his own business, Gomez Pallet Corporation, to supplement his income from IBP. He 
manufactured wooden pallets that he sold to companies around the region, including IBP 
itself, which allowed him to quit his meatpacking job after a few years. In addition to his 
business, Gomez also served on the Nebraska Mexican American Commission from 
1981to 2002, the St. Michael‟s Parish Council from 1982 to 1986, the Hispanic 
Committee at St. Michael‟s from 1982 to 1988, and the Briar Cliff College (Sioux City, 
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Iowa) Board of Trustees from 1997 to 2000.
47
 He thus became a leader not only within 
the immigrant community on the local level, but at the regional and state levels as well. 
Continued Challenges and Adaptations 
 During the spring and summer of 1999, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) implemented a new approach to strengthen interior enforcement of 
immigration laws (as opposed to efforts to enforce those laws in border regions). This 
effort, dubbed Operation Vanguard because it was intended to be just the beginning of a 
wider interior enforcement effort, targeted every meatpacking operation in the state of 
Nebraska plus a few plants in western Iowa counties. Previous efforts to enforce 
immigration laws in the interior of the country had relied on raids of businesses, often 
meatpacking plants, suspected of employing undocumented workers. In Operation 
Vanguard, the INS hoped to avoid the disruption caused by such raids but also to be more 
thorough than a raid on a single plant could be. The INS subpoenaed employment records 
from all meatpacking employers in the targeted region and checked the information 
against databases of other government agencies, such as the Social Security 
Administration, to locate any inconsistencies. Out of approximately 24,000 meatpacking 
workers in Nebraska, about 4,500 records contained some sort of discrepancy and the 
companies were required to notify these employees to appear at work on a day that INS 
agents would come to interview them. Not surprisingly, only about one third of those 
notified showed up on the appointed days. Over 2,000 “suspect” workers quit their jobs 
rather than submit to interviews, which the INS concluded was an indication that they 
were not legally authorized to work. The American Meat Institute (AMI), and the 
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meatpacking companies it represents, suggested instead that the INS‟s interview tactics 
simply intimidated legal workers with questions such as “Are you or any members of 
your family not authorized to be present in the United States?”48 Of those who did show 
up for their INS interviews, only 34 out of more than 1,000 interviewees were arrested 
and deported. The AMI concluded: “Operation Vanguard [was] an irrational approach to 
interior immigration enforcement: it was all economic pain for Nebraska residents, with 
no measurable immigration-enforcement gain.”49   
 Operation Vanguard was poorly received in the communities where meatpacking 
operations were targeted and it met opposition from an unusual mix of groups. In 
addition to the meatpacking industry‟s opposition, the National Council of La Raza asked 
President Bill Clinton to suspend further implementation of the program because it fueled 
racism against Latinos and Asians.
50
 Lourdes Gouveia, a sociologist at the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha who had been studying the relationship between meatpacking and 
immigration for over a decade, characterized the meaning of the immigration 
enforcement effort this way: “Operation Vanguard can be viewed as a set of practices and 
discourses which ultimately contributed to the historical devaluation of immigrant 
workers‟ role in feeding U.S. consumers. Unlike the wholesome and virtuous farmers . . . 
with whom customers can readily identify and trust, immigrants are reduced to the status 
of „illegal aliens‟, and thus devoid of identity, history, and humanity.”51 While the 
particular reasons that scholars, civil rights groups, and the meatpacking industry‟s trade 
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group opposed Operation Vanguard may have differed, their unity in opposing the plan, 
along with the incredibly low rate of success in identifying and deporting undocumented 
workers, suggests that it was a failure.  
 In Nebraska, the meatpacking industry drew continued attention in the wake of 
Operation Vanguard and media reports later in 1999 describing poor working 
conditions.
52
 IBP spokesman Gary Mickelson defended the company‟s record, arguing 
that “Preventing employee injuries and illnesses is important to us from both a human 
and economic standpoint.”53 The increased attention to these issues prompted Nebraska 
governor Mike Johanns to assign Lieutenant Governor David Maurstad to conduct a 
review of working conditions in Nebraska‟s meatpacking plants. In a memorandum to 
Governor Johanns outlining his findings, Maurstad did not mention the competing 
interests--employment and economic development, workers‟ rights and human rights--
that made the matter a complicated one, but he did acknowledge indirectly that the issues 
were complex: “There are no easy solutions,” he wrote.54  
 Maurstad‟s investigation into work conditions at meatpacking plants, which 
included visits to processing operations and meetings with workers, uncovered concerns 
that generally fell into four categories: “Abusive and Discriminatory Language and 
Behavior by Supervisors, …Inadequate Communication of Company Policy & 
Inadequate Training,…Unsanitary Working Conditions,…[and] Unsafe Working 
Conditions.”55  He made several recommendations for addressing these issues, including 
increasing safety training, further study of line speed and its impact on workers, and a 
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Worker‟s Bill of Rights to be developed by the Nebraska Department of Labor.56 In June 
2000, following Maurstad‟s recommendations, Governor Johanns did sign a Meatpacking 
Worker Bill of Rights. It enumerated eleven entitlements including the right to organize, 
a safe workplace, complete information regarding the terms of employment, and access to 
existing state agencies and legal protections for addressing grievances.
57
 On the local 
level, the community continued to organize to meet short-term needs but also began 
addressing longer-term concerns.  
Norma de la O emerged as another community leader at the turn of the twenty-
first century. After graduating from South Sioux City High School and attending a few 
years of college, de la O began working in jobs that, in various ways, offered social 
services for community members. In the late 1980s, she worked as a police officer in 
Dakota City and for Goldenrod Hills Community Action before moving to Garden City, 
Kansas. In Garden City, her husband worked in meatpacking and Norma worked for a 
social services agency during the rapid growth of the immigrant population after the 
construction of two beef processing plants there in the 1980s. When Norma and her 
husband moved back to South Sioux City in the late 1990s, she continued that work in 
her formal career with the New Iowan Center, a part of Iowa Workforce Development in 
Sioux City designed to help immigrants to the region. But she set about organizing the 
Latino community through independent efforts as well.  
In 2000, de la O and others organized the first Cinco de Mayo celebration in the 
Siouxland. One of the benefits of emphasizing positive cultural celebrations, de la O said, 
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was that it brought together both established and newly arrived immigrants as well as 
other community members from a wide variety of cultural backgrounds. She compared 
the Cinco de Mayo festivities to similar celebrations of European cultural heritage 
common in towns throughout the Midwest. In 2002, seeing a need for some organization 
to improve conditions in general for the Latino community and to make progress 
possible, she led the formation of two groups, the Siouxland Latino Leadership group and 
Siouxland Unidad Latina, “created to empower, promote and develop the Siouxland 
Latino Community.”58 De la O saw a need for more emphasis on leadership and 
education and through these groups she was able to promote both. Siouxland Latino 
Leadership offered workshops to help local residents of all ages develop leadership skills 
and strategies. Unidad Latina, among other things, offered scholarships to students 
pursuing college education.
59
 
Anglo community leaders in South Sioux City and Dakota City put a positive spin 
on the changes the community underwent; many were especially proud to note the 
determination of Latino immigrants and their work ethic.
60
 But such praise for the work 
ethic of new immigrants should be treated with caution, warn sociologists Gouveia, 
Carranza, and Cogua: “Their work ethic is celebrated by employers and townsfolk but 
such celebrations may unwittingly or conveniently stigmatize and racialize Mexicans as 
the group that is best fitted to do the dirty work and to occupy the lower rungs of our 
social institutions.”61  
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In 2001, IBP‟s phenomenal growth and success as a business ended when the 
company was acquired by Tyson Foods, Inc., making Tyson the largest producer of meat 
products in the United States (the company processed one out of every four pounds of 
beef, pork, and chicken in the country). There is no clear way to determine if IBP‟s 
revolutionary approach to meat processing, developed from 1960 to 2000, was an overall 
benefit to communities like Dakota City and South Sioux City; it depends on who you 
ask. Certainly some immigrants were able to capitalize on an initial opportunity for a 
decent--albeit difficult and dangerous--job and create a stable and prosperous life for their 
families. The Diaz‟s story illustrates what was possible. After over twenty years of work 
in meatpacking, they had saved enough to open a restaurant and work for themselves. All 
four of their children pursued successful careers outside of the packing industry. Others, 
especially those who arrived after wages declined in the 1980s and the line speed was 
increased, were unable to make a decent living or were disabled by their time on the 
processing line. After working at IBP from 1992 until 2000, Duc Tran suffered a heart 
attack and had to take some time off of work. He attempted to go back several times after 
his doctor cleared him to return to work, but between his weakened heart health and the 
effects of cumulative stress injury in his hands (which caused them to go numb after even 
short periods of knife work) he was unable to meet the physical demands of work on the 
processing line any longer. Because of his poor health, he was also unable to find work 
elsewhere. Duc did receive some Social Security disability benefits, which helped his 
family.
62
 
For the established residents of Dakota City and South Sioux City, the outcomes 
of the IBP‟s arrival were similarly mixed. These communities would almost certainly be 
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smaller and less well-off today were it not for IBP‟s decision to build there in 1964. 
Lance Hedquist, a lifetime resident of South Sioux City and the City Administrator since 
1980 characterized the community as little but “used cars and bars” during the 1950s and 
1960s. South Sioux City had a reputation for spring flooding, poor housing, and a high 
crime rate during that time. The jobs provided by the construction and operation of IBP‟s 
slaughter and processing plant changed the community for the better, Hedquist said. 
Other industries were attracted to the area in the following decades, so IBP‟s operations 
in Dakota County not only meant over 2,000 jobs for local workers at the packing plant, 
but also created conditions which led to additional economic development during the 
1980s and 1990s.
63
 The presence of some of the residents of Dakota County in 2000 
whose families had lived in the area for decades could, like the presence of immigrants, 
be attributed to the packing plant. Most rural communities experienced population loss 
during this time period as young people sought opportunities elsewhere, but the Anglo 
population of Dakota Country grew by over 15 percent. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Changes in the meatpacking industry following IBP‟s revolutionary approach to 
cattle slaughter and beef processing created significant shifts in the communities that 
were home to their plants. First, the revitalized meatpacking industry provided a base for 
economic growth in rural communities that were otherwise facing stagnation or decline. 
Further, industrial change spurred immigration to rural areas when demand for low-wage 
labor outstripped the local supply in places like Dakota County, leading to population 
growth in these communities while other rural towns lost population. Neither of these two 
significant historical trends--industrial change in meatpacking and immigration--would 
have happened as they did without the other.  
The political discussion about immigration, especially in the 1990s, focused on 
illegal immigration. But beginning the story with the migrant‟s action--crossing the 
border without proper documentation--ignores the industrial changes that created the 
demand for immigration beyond what could be supplied within legal limits. In 
meatpacking and in other industries, the need for low-wage laborers was greater than the 
local supply. This excess demand attracted newcomers. 
Despite the development of a system of employment practices and immigration 
by the end of the twentieth century, many challenges continued for the industry and for 
workers. Political backlash against employers who hired undocumented workers kept the 
meatpacking industry‟s labor practices in the news. Workers continued to struggle for fair 
treatment and safe working conditions, with only minimal success. A study of the impact 
of the Nebraska Meatpacking Worker Bill of Rights conducted by Nebraska Appleseed in 
2006 concluded that it had little effect: “In communities across Nebraska that have meat-
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processing plants, neither workers‟ awareness of their rights nor the freedom to assert 
them has changed significantly since the introduction of the [Meatpacking Worker] Bill 
of Rights six years ago.”1 “What happens is that what it says out there [on the bill posted 
outside the working area] is not followed inside,” one worker explained.2 
While many migrants‟ motivation to move was economic, their experiences in the 
Siouxland were shaped by both economic and social factors. Workplace hazards were a 
significant part of the experiences of immigrants to rural meatpacking communities in the 
late twentieth century, but other factors shaped their experiences as well. In Dakota 
County, the existence of a labor union helped to protect workers to some extent, although 
the strength of meatpacking unions (and the labor movement in general) declined 
throughout this period. Religious communities, neighbors, and family connections all 
served to help early immigrants adapt to their new homes. Immigrants who arrived in the 
late 1980s and 1990s also benefited from the earlier immigrant community‟s success. 
Immigrant-owned businesses, Latino civic leaders, and independent social action 
organizations all made for a more welcoming atmosphere in addition to the concrete 
changes--such as the increased availability of English language classes and Latino 
leadership initiatives--that eased the transition for newcomers. 
Dakota City and South Sioux City experienced significant changes in the ethnic 
and cultural makeup of their populations between 1960 and 2000 and also experienced 
economic growth while other small rural communities in the region declined. This 
economic success allowed what many people (established residents and newcomers alike) 
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considered the positive aspects of small-town life to persist: small businesses on Dakota 
Avenue catered to the needs of the community, religious communities remained central 
for both spiritual and social reasons, and residents generally felt safe and secure in their 
homes and neighborhoods. 
Despite the apparent economic success of communities tied to meatpacking 
plants, there were costs brought about by the modernization of the industry. IBP 
employed many residents of Dakota County, but unlike meatpacking workers at mid-
century, workers‟ wages in the 1980s and 1990s were sometimes not enough to provide a 
comfortable and stable living for their families. One common trend in rural communities 
during the second half of the twentieth century, population decline, was mitigated in 
Dakota County by an influx of new immigrants, but the poverty and lack of opportunity 
for advancement that plagued rural communities across the country did not spare Dakota 
City and South Sioux City. 
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